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ABSTRACT

The Midwife and Birth of Conservatism in 1960:
Barry Goldwater and the Ascendancy
Of the Right in the GOP
By
Thomas R. Wahl
Dr. Richard Jensen, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Communication
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The Midwife and Birth o f Conservatism in 1960 studies the rise of the
dissident minority conservative faction of the Republican Party during the 1950s
and early 1960s and its takeover of the Republican Party in 1964.

Using

es+ablished communication theories that define a social movement and a
movement leader, the paper attempts to judge if the conservative movement and
its leader, Barry Goldwater, can be viewed as, respectively, a full-fledged social
movement and social movement leader. The thesis examines its subjects in a
rhetorical and historical context by studying the rhetoric and historical events
surrounding the ascension of the right and Goldwater’s leadership position.

Ill
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the United States a t this time [1950], liberalism is not only the dominant but
even the sole intellectual tradition. For it is the plain fact that nowadays there are
no conservative...ideas in genera! circulation.
Lionel Trilling (Dunn & Woodard, 1996, p. 1)
Studies of the 1960s, whether political examinations, journalistic reviews,
or historical analyses, typically focus on the era’s liberal movements and their
leaders. Therefore, while covering areas such as the rise of the New Left, the
ascension of the Great Society, and the influence of student leaders and groups
(such as Tom Hayden and the Students for a Democratic Society), research
ignores equally momentous events and leaders of the right. As Mary Brennan
notes in her study of the sixties:
A one-dimensional view of the 1960s as a decade of radical movements
drew the focus away from other important developments occurring during
that time. Journalists and scholars, by spotlighting only the protesters,
students, hippies, and demonstrators, ignored the action taking place at
stage right and therefore presented a lopsided view of the decade. They
spoke of political and social polarization but concentrated their attention
and study on the Left. (1995, p. 1)
Charles Dunn and J. David Woodard provide further acknowledgement of
the lack of study of conservatives:
The 1994 election confirmed a realignment of American politics along
conservative lines in the general electorate, but in the halls of academe
conservatism remains a neglected subject, on the fringes of the curriculum
1
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and outside the door of the faculty lounge.
Many academics are
politicallyliberal, and few scholars in the social science disciplines take
conservative intellectual positions seriously. (1996, p. vii)
The lack of attention given to studies of the right is certainly not due to
limited public interest in conservative ideas.

Indeed, an increasing interest in

conservative thought and its acceptance in all realms of society were evident in
the 1950s and early 1960s.

On the literary side, for example, conservative

publications such as National Review and Human Events were becoming
increasingly popular. The period also witnessed an increase in the popularity of
the books and ideas of libertarian Ayn Rand among those disenchanted with big
government and “big brother.”

Further, in 1960, Senator Barry Goldwater

published what would become the best selling political book of the century. The
Conscience of a Conservative (Edwards, 1988, p. 60).
Another example of the breadth of society’s interest in conservative ideas
is seen among the college students of the time. In 1960, conservative college
students founded the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF).

Clubs quickly

spread across the country’s campuses and YAF members actively supported
numerous conservative causes. Youthful members demonstrated at the White
House; worked for political campaigns (such as William F. Buckley, Jr.’s race for
mayor of New York and Goldwater’s run for the presidency in 1964); organized
food, medicine and clothing drives for Vietnamese war refugees; and, put
together “bleed-ins” (blood drives) and mail campaigns for American soldiers
fighting in Vietnam (Edwards, 1988, p. 58).

As early as 1962, the YAF was

strong enough to sponsor a political rally in New York City at Madison Square
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3
Garden. The event drew over 18,000 people and grossed $80,000 from ticket
sales

(Rusher, 1984, p. 129).

The significance of the conservative youth

movement is described by Theodore White in his book. The Making of the
President 1964: ‘The Young Republicans are far, far more important in their party
than any junior Democrats on the other side of the divide” (White, 1966, p. 114).
As a result of the previously mentioned focus on events and issues of the
left, there is a deficiency today of analyses of the conservative movement of the
1960s and its leaders.

The intent of this study is to address this void by

examining a significant segment of the early nineteen-sixties culture that has
been neglected in prior studies: the shift in power in the Republican Party in 1964
from the ruling liberal establishment to the minority conservative right wing.
Using established theories as parameters (outlined later in this chapter
and detailed in Chapter 2), the study will analyze whether the actions of the
dissident right wing in the 1950s and early 1960s against the Republican Party’s
ruling power was a social movement.

In addition, the thesis will ascertain

whether Barry Goldwater, the conservatives’ spokesperson (Brennan, 1995, p.
24) and, as described by the Los Angeles Times, the “leading conservative
thinker in American public life” (Iverson, 1997, p. 94), can be viewed as a
movement leader.^
Two factors influenced the takeover of the Republican Party by the
conservative faction. The first was a string of events that occurred during the
1950s and 1960 and the responses to those events by the ruling party
establishment (the specific events will be described in Chapter 2).
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As a

consequence of the establishment’s actions, members of the right wing were left
feeling that their ideas and candidates had been ignored, neglected, and
purposely isolated by the ruling establishment.
A second development was that America’s postwar growth during the
nineteen-fifties was creating a factionalization in the Republican Party between
the liberal ruling sector and the conservative wing.

To understand this

factionalization and the tension it was creating in the party, the makeup of the
establishment and the right must be defined.
First, the party’s ruling establishment was “predominantly Eastern,
internationalist, urban types they [the conservatives] contemptuously called ‘metoo’ Republicans [in response to th eir similarities to the Democrats]” (Wicker,
1963, p. 26). Additionally, the establishment members were seen as being “highminded, sometimes high-handed,

moderate Republicans from the Eastern

Establishment, and they ran the party - and the nation - during the Eisenhower
years” (Stengel, 1986, p. 24).
Key players in the Eastern Establishment included attorney Herbert
Brownell, Jr.; diplomat John Foster Dulles; Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr.; Eastern corporate leaders and financiers (such as the AldrichRockefeller family that controlled

Chase Bank); and.

East coast media

publications (the New York Herald Tribune, the New York Times, and Time
Magazine) (Kolkey, 1983, p. 22). As Brennan describes them:
These Republicans shared a common background of Ivy League
educations, exclusive club memberships, and financial success.
Operating many of the m ajor corporations of the United States, they
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controlled the purse strings of the party and of any candidate who wanted
to win on the national level. Although some members were from outside
the Northeast, such as Thomas Dewey and Wendell Willkie, they had only
succeeded after they moved to the East. Members of the “Establishment,”
assuming that they knew what was best for the entire country, held sway
through their occupation of policy-making positions throughout the
executive branch as well as their manipulation of the party machinery.
(1995, p. 8)
The programs and budgets advanced by the Eastern establishment were
New Deal type policies that maintained and expanded the role of government.
Behind this strategy was the “belief that such policies would alleviate class
conflicts, lead to economic stability, and keep governmental control in their
hands” (Brennan, 1995, p. 8).
In contrast, the conservative wing was made up primarily of people from
the growing West and the South. They were entrepreneurs who made money off
the postwar boom and the oil industry and wanted a greater voice in national
politics. They “stressed individual initiative over welfare programs, preferred free
enterprise rather than govemment regulation, and desired a return to local
control over matters such as schools, taxes, and race relations” (Brennan, 1995,
p. 8).

As such, the New Deal type programs that the establishment was

embracing appalled them.
Thus, there were philosophical disagreements between the party’s two
wings, as well as geographic and socioeconomic divisions. As a result of these
differences, the Republican right wing had come to view the establishment with
disdain.

In the conservatives’ eyes, the establishment was essentially no

different than the New Deal Democrats whose programs had ruled the country
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since before World War II.

In other words, the right’s view of what the

establishment offered as programs mirrored sociologist Daniel Bell’s assessment
of the consensus politics of the U.S., namely “that politicians no longer argued
over issues, only over the degree to which policies should be implemented”
(quoted in Brennan, 1995, p. 20).
This study will attempt to determine if the conservative movement within
the Republican Party during the late 1950s and early 1960s was a social
movement.

The movement was not a collection of isolated incidents within a

small segment of the population, nor was it a short-term phenomenon. In fact,
the shift in power produced repercussions that had dramatic long-term effects on
the nation’s political scene. The power base of the Republican Party switched to
the South and the West, where it remains today.
conservative influence in the party.

This shift ensured the

In addition, beginning in 1968, Republican

candidates won five of the next six presidential elections. This trend ultimately
affected the Democratic Party. In order to regain the White House, Democrats
had to re-shape their image and incorporate conservative ideas into their
campaigns.

Thus, voters in 1996 witnessed President Clinton running for re-

election with a conservative campaign manager while calling for welfare reform
and tax cuts-ideas previously anathema to Democrats.
As such, the study of Barry Goldwater and the rise of the conservative
movement in the sixties warrant coverage commensurate to other movements of
the time.
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Literature Review
A variety of types of literature will be used in this study. First, newspaper
and magazine accounts will be reviewed. These accounts include media outlets
such as The New York Tim es. The New York Times Magazine: the Washington
Post, US News & World Report. Tim e. The Economist and The Wall Street
Journal. Magazine and newspaper sources will provide independent accounts
from the 1950s and 1960s of events related to and surrounding the rise of the
conservative faction. These analyses will add “eye witness” perspectives of the
right’s rise in the context of the specific time period as a balance to studies of the
study’s subject that offer historical perspectives from a later time.
The second source of literature will be books and professional articles that
either address the rise of the conservatives or deal with issues pertinent to their
ascension to power. These books include Mary Brennan’s Turning Right in the
Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP: Godfrey Hodgson’s The World
Turned Right Side U p : Charles Dunn and J. David Woodard’s The Conservative
Tradition in America. Theodore W hite’s The Making of the President 1964. Sara
Diamond’s Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the
United States. Peter Iverson’s Barrv Goldwater:

Native Arizonan. Robert

Goldberg’s Barrv Goldwater. Paul Gottfried’s The Conservative M ovement;
William Rusher’s The Rise of the Right; Russell Kirk’s The Conservative M ind;
and, Clinton Rossiteris Conservatism in America. These books are useful in that
they provide a summary the conservative movement’s rise, the people involved.
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and the events that led to the rise as viewed by different participants and
obsenrers. Thus, a balanced look at the study’s subject will be attained.
In addition to the above, Barry Goldwater’s books will also be incorporated
into the study.

These are his two autobiographies, Goldwater and With No

Apologies: and. The Conscience of a Conservative and Whv Not Victory. His
books are useful for studying because they provide a first person perspective of
the movement and of his decisions and actions.
Academic articles to be studied come from a variety of sources, including
journals in the areas of communication, political science, and history. One article
in particular addresses the subject of this paper, Mary Brennan’s “A Step in the
‘Right’ Direction: Conservative Republicans and the Election of 1960” from
Presidential Studies Quarterly. Other articles offer analyses of events relevant to
Goldwater and the conservative movement in the 1960s. These include David
Castle’s “Goldwater’s Presidential Candidacy and Political Realignment” from
Presidential Studies Quarterly and Kurt Schuppara’s “Freedom vs. Tyranny: The
1958 Califomia Election and the Origins of the State’s Conservative Movement”
from Pacific Historical Review.
There are also articles from communication journals that address subjects
relevant to this thesis.

These studies are pertinent in that the articles offer a

rhetorical perspective of the events surrounding rise of the right. The Quarterly
Journal of Speech offers studies of each presidential election and as such will be
useful for this study.

John C. Hammerback’s “Barry Goldwater’s Rhetoric of

Rugged Individualism” in the Quarterly Journal of Speech and his collaboration

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
with Richard J. Jensen in “Barry Morris Goldwater” in American Orators of the
Twentieth Century both provide insight into the rhetoric of Goldwater as leader of
the right wing. In addition, Dale Leathers’ “Fundamentalism of the Radical Right”
in The Southern Speech Journal and Barbara W am ick’s ‘The Rhetoric of
Conservative Resistance” in The Southem Speech Communication Joumal offer
analyses of the extreme right which will be helpful in studying Goldwater and his
base of right wing supporters.
Other academic articles to be used in this study deal specifically with
social movements. These studies outline the definitions and characteristics of a
social movement, the elements of which can be applied to the analysis of
Goldwater and the rise of the right. Specific articles include Herbert W. Simons’
“Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social
Movements” from The Quarterly Joumal of Speech: Simons’ “On the Rhetoric of
Social Movements, Historical Movements, and T o p Down’ Movements: A
Commentary” written in Communication Studies: Malcolm Q. Sillars “Defining
Movements Rhetorically: Casting the Widest Net” in The Southem Speech
Communication Joumal: and,

Charles J.

Stewart’s ‘The

Evolution of a

Revolution: Stokely Carmichael and the Rhetoric of Black Power” in Quarterly
Joumal of Speech.
Finally, the Internet will be explored for articles of interest to this study.
Internet sites from think tanks, periodicals, and web journals can provide useful
insights that may not be found through traditional resource centers such as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
libraries.

However, the information found and its source will be carefully

reviewed and checked for its credibility.

Methodology
As

mentioned earlier, this study

will

examine the ascent of the

conservative movement within the Republican Party, and Goldwater’s position in
the movement. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the conservatives’
revolt can be considered a social movement and if Goldwater can be viewed as a
movement leader.
Various alternatives exist as to the definition of a social movement. Most
theories are collective oriented and focus on, as William Bruce Cameron (1966)
describes it, the groups aim to “alter or supplant some portion of the existing
culture or social order” (p. 7).

Additionally, to distinguish a movement from a

trend, agitation, or unruly disturbance, there must be a recognized organization
to the group in the form of “leaders (spokespersons), membership (followers and
believers), and organizations” (Stewart, Smith & Denton, 1994, p. 3).

For

example, in his work on grassroots movements, Robert A. Goldberg (1991)
defines a social movement as “a formally organized group that acts consciously
and with some continuity to promote or resist change through collective action”
(p. 2).

John W. Bowers, Donovan J. Ochs, and Richard J. Jensen in The

Rhetoric of Agitation and Control (1993) offer an additional definition that
incorporates a movement’s rhetorical needs.
movements

exist when

“(1)

people

outside

The authors state that social
the

normal decision-making
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establishment (2) advocate significant social change and (3) encounter a degree
of resistance within the establishment such as to require more than the normal
discursive means of persuasion” (p. 4).
This paper though will focus on Stewart, Smith and Denton’s (1989)
definition that a movement is an organized group whose focus is “to bring about
or to resist a program of change in societal norms and values” (p. 17).
Additionally, the paper will include as organized groups those collectivities that
are part of established order within society (e.g., political parties).

As Simons

(1991) states, movements are not solely “bottom up struggles by groups at the
margins of society” (p. 100), but are also “top down” from within an institution.
Thus, the spectrum of social movements include struggles “by people in positions
of institutional authority on behalf of a cause whose guiding ideas, characteristic
modes

of

actions,

or

organizational

structures

have

not

been

fully

institutionalized” by their organization (Simons, 1991, p. 100).
For the purpose of this paper, two established social movement related
studies (described in Chapter 2) will be used: Charles J. Stewart, Craig Allen
Smith, and Robert E. Denton, Jr.’s “The Life Cycle of Social Movements” (1989);
and Herbert W. Simons’ “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of
Persuasion for Social Movements” (1970).

The first study provides the

framework by which the life cycles of a social movement can be outlined and
analyzed and the latter work outlines the characteristics of a movement leader.
Using these two studies as an apparatus, this paper’s analysis will be able to
judge:
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1. Whether the rise of the minority conservative faction within the
structure of an established political organization (the Republican Party)
can be viewed as a social movement; and,
2. If Goldwater, as the publicly viewed leader of the right wing, fits the
description of a social movement leader.
In summary, the methodology of this paper will incorporate established
theories (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, and Simons) that outline parameters
defining what is a social movement and who are its leaders. Using an historical
and rhetorical perspective, these theories will be applied to the rise of the
conservatives

in the

Republican

Party and

Goldwater’s position as the

conservatives’ leader. As such, the thesis will be able to conclude whether the
revolt against the Republican Party’s ruling establishment by the right wing
constitutes a takeover by a defined social movement from within the party, and if
Goldwater can be considered a movement leader of the right’s ascension to
power.

Summary
Chapter 1 will introduce the purpose of the stud y-to determine if the rise
of the conservative movement within the Republican Party during the late 1950s
and early 1960s was a social movement and if Goldwater, the right’s leader, can
be viewed as a movement leader. The chapter will also summarize the materials
to be used to describe the historical events surrounding the rise of the right, and
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to analyze the study’s stated purpose.

Finally, the chapter will describe the

methodology to be used in the study.
The second chapter will define the methodology the paper will use to
determine if the conservative movement fits the characteristics of a social
movement; and, Goldwater’s position as leader of the movement.

This

methodology will be from Simons’ findings on social movements’ leaders and
Stewart, Smith, and Denton’s analysis of the life cycle of social movements.
Chapter 3 will contain a summary of the events that contributed to the
frustration and anger of the Republican Party’s right wing and led to their revolt
against the Party’s establishment. The chapter will also review Goldwater’s path
to leader of the conservative movement.
In Chapter 4, the paper’s methodology will be applied to the events
detailed in Chapter 3.
Finally, Chapter 5 will make a judgement conceming the paper’s thesis
based on application of the methodology applied in Chapter 4.

In addition to

concluding whether the rise of the right wing represented a true social
movement, this chapter will discuss what has been learned about Goldwater and
the conservative movement, about communication and its relation to social
movements, and what future studies the study’s findings give rise to.
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Chapter Notes
^This thesis is studying the possibility of a social movement that exists
within one of society’s established political organization, as opposed to a
movement that is pitted against society’s established organizations. Therefore, it
is useful to define certain terms that will be used throughout the paper.

The

terms “movement,” “minority,” or “conservatives” in a phrase or sentence will
refer to the conservative faction (or the right wing) of the Republican Party. Use
of the terms “ruling,” “establishment,” or “liberal” will refer to the ruling powers of
the Republican Party.

Also, unless otherwise stated, “party” will mean the

Republican Party.
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CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

As mentioned in Chapter 1, this paper will study the ascent of the
conservative movement within the Republican Party and Barry Gold water's role
in the movement. The study will be conducted by incorporating elements from
two social movement studies that offer definitions of social movements and of
movement leaders.

Using these two studies as vehicles to define a social

movement and a movement leader, this study's analysis will attempt to judge the
following two issues:
1. Whether the rise of the minority conservative faction within the
structure of an established political organization (the Republican Party)
can be viewed as a social movement; and,
2. If Goldwater, as the publicly viewed leader of the right wing, fits the
description of a social movement leader.
The theories employed for this paper’s study are elaborated in the
following pages. The study will then apply these theories to the study of the right.
This process will consist of two steps: (a) looking at the actions, strategy, and
discourse (e.g., publications, statements, speeches, writings, etc.) surrounding
historical events significant to the movement; and (b) evaluating the applicability
15
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of the reviewed elements as respects the definitions established by the
selected theories.

Issue 1
As a framework for defining a social movement, the study will use Charles
J. Stewart, Craig Allen Smith, and Robert E. Denton, Jr.’s ‘The Life Cycle of
Social Movements” (1989).

Even though the variables that make up a social

movement (e.g., its success or failure, rate of growth, strategies, etc) “will not fit
any a p/fon formula” (Cameron, 1966, pp. 27-29), common traits can be found in
a movement that will identify it as one.

Testifying to the commonalties of

movements, Sillars (1980) writes “Each movement exhibits a pattern of events
which can be seen in other movements....[There are] laws or rules which are
revealed in a variety of movements and which will predict the stages and
activities of some new movement (p. 20).
Therefore, in analyzing the rise of the right as a social movement, Stewart,
Smith, and Denton’s work is useful because it effectively defines the life cycle of
a social movement. Stewart, Smith, and Denton’s model defines a movement
through the existence of five distinct stages. They are as follows:

Stage 1. Genesis
Social movements begin during what is generally considered to be
peaceful times as regards the problem to be addressed by the movement.
The establishment either does not see the problem or else views it as
inconsequential in comparison to the matters it has at hand. However, a
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perceived frustration, or “imperfection in the existing order” (Stewart, et al.,
1994, p. 72) (i.e., abuse of power, inequality, etc.) is present among
certain individuals, who typically are unaware of each other due to
geographic separateness.

As opposed to the establishment, the

concemed individuals perceive the flaw as alarming and becoming more
so unless the institution addresses the problem quickly and resolutely.
In this stage, early leaders appear who attempt to bring to light
what they perceive as the establishment’s neglect of the imperfection and
the exigency of the situation. The leaders, often naively, believe that the
establishment will act quickly once the institution’s leaders and followers
are informed of the imperfection and the urgent need for a solution. As
such, the leaders act more as educators than agitators, putting forth
various communiqués (e.g., books, articles, speeches, etc.) in an attempt
to “create interest within an audience for perceiving and solving the
problem” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 73). Few establishment members give
the leaders serious attention and therefore, little opposition exists to the
fledgling movement.
The life of the first stage varies.

It may last months or years.

Eventually though, the cycle ends when a “triggering event” occurs-a
catalyst that upheaves the unorganized individuals into the next stage of
“social unrest.” This event generally comes from outside the movement in
the form of a Supreme Court decision, continued dismissal by the
establishment of the movement’s concerns, a new law, or an infuriating
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comment by the establishment.

For example, in 1915, a North Dakota

legislator’s statement to Midwest farmers that they “go home and slop
[their] hogs” led to the formation of tne Nonpartisan League (Stewart, et
al., 1994, p. 73).

Stage 2. Social Unrest
The second

stage

is evidenced

by

increasing

numbers

of

disaffected members who step forward to voice their distress over the
perceived exigency.

Movement members start to join as they hear

agitators within the movement speak out. Listening to their calls to action,
disparate members now begin to organize. As a result, members develop
a doctrine that presents the movement’s basic ideology. Included in the
discourse is the perceived problem, its cause, and its solution.
In response, the establishment starts to openly recognize the
existence of the young movement. However, it dismisses the significance
of the problem and the movement’s reputability.

The establishment

usually ignores and is derisive of the cause, hoping that the movement
simply fades away.

Along with the establishment, the media pays little

interest, usually echoing the institution’s sentiments toward the movement.
Additionally, a spirit of collectivity begins in this stage. A slogan is
created that unifies the members (e.g., the pro-choice movement’s “Never
to laugh or love” or Black Power’s “All power to the people” (Stewart, et
al., 1994, p. [76])). Also, the act of joining the movement distinguishes its
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members from establishment members.

Finally, as members of a

movement, they begin to view its purpose as a mission.
As with the first stage, movement members and leaders in stage
two still believe that the institution will respond to the movement’s
exigence with timely and appropriate actions. As stated by the authors,
the movement's “faith in progress through the social chain-of-command
remains strong” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 77).
The time span of stage two is dependent on a number of factors.
These include the number of people who join the movement, the
establishment’s responses, and further catalytic events.
The last item is important because it lays the groundwork for the
next stage. As more events of this sort occur, and the establishment fails
to respond, members begin to lose confidence in the desire and ability of
the establishment to address the movement’s concems.

Also, members

begin realizing that persuasive petitioning through the established norms
will not initiate action from the establishment.

Finally, members begin to

realize that either the establishment is the problem or that it is working to
squelch

reasonable

efforts

movement’s exigencies.

to

effect

imperative

solutions

As such, members’ “ frustration

to the
leads to

disaffection with institutions and their abilities to resolve problems,”
(Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 77). At this point, the social movement enters the
stage of enthusiastic mobilization.
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Stage 3. Enthusiastic Mobilization
Next, movements enter a stage where members “have grown ‘sick
and tired of being sick and tired’” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 77). Members
conclude that the establishment will not implement change and that
change will not come via petitions through the normal channels.
Therefore, members

look outside the institution to initiate change.

Members start to hold mass meetings, demonstrations, and take their
appeal directly to the people.

To members, working outside the

establishment is the avenue to implement needed change.
Additionally, word of the movement spreads. As a result, its ranks
start to include individuals who lend credibility to the cause (e.g.,
politicians, professionals, civic leaders, entertainers, etc.).
Among the opposition, increased notice is taken of the movement’s
actions, growth and mobilization; and, the movement begins to be seen as
a peril to the establishment’s authority.

Establishment leaders start to

mobilize. They respond through such actions as labeling the movement
leaders as extreme and out of touch, or instigating and supporting new
“grass roots” counter movements meant to divert the social movement’s
resources.
As a result, the movement has to adjust strategies to deal with the
establishments’ responses. Leaders are required who are knowledgeable
at responding to its reactions and adept at consolidating the movement’s
power by coalescing groups within it.
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Leaders also start utilizing severe rhetoric to “pressure institutions
into capitulation or compromise, to polarize the movement and its
opposition (all who are not actively supporting the movement), and to
provoke repressive acts that reveal the true ugliness of institutions and
counterefforts” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 79).

This is a sensitive area.

Rhetoric too harsh or actions too drastic may result in a loss of support.
Leaders must be cognizant of the fact that rhetoric and actions in the
movement’s name

are

perceived as rhetoric and

actions

by the

movement.
Finally, splinter organizations (sometimes antagonistic) emerge
within the movement.

The movement must carefully work to keep the

groups together under one tent working in one direction. Fracturing of the
overall movement, or extreme demands, can direct energy away from the
original exigence and deplete intemal and extemal support.

Stage 4. Maintenance
The fourth stage is important in that it sets the stage for some form
of victory or defeat.
movement quiets down.
channels, such

Movement activity and attention paid to the
Means of persuasion return to established

as “pen and

printer and from

legislative, judicial,

conference, convention, and lecture halls” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 81).
Consequently, the movement’s needs for leadership changes. How
well this is handled determines the success of the movement.
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leaders’ principal persuasive purpose now becomes sustaining the
movement’s progress. Leaders must go beyond being an agitator to being
a statesman. While they still have to communicate their ideology, mobilize
the followers, and attract new members, leaders must now also be adept
at dealing in a rational manner with differing intemal elements as well as
establishment leaders.

Additionally, leaders need to be capable of

attending to organizational and administrative duties.

The qualifications

are necessary so the leaders can maintain the gains they have achieved
and “sustain the movement’s fonward progress as it emerges from its ‘trial
by fire’” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 81).

Stage 5. Termination
At this point, the movement ends. “If a social movement maintains
an effective organization and its principles come to match the current
mores,” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 83) the movement becomes the new
establishment. The other outcome is that the movement is “absorbed or
coopted by established institutions....with no recognition of the social
movements that championed them for years” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 84).
With either new status, members fade away or become part of the
establishment.
This paper will undertake an analysis of those stages germane to the rise
of the conservative movement as it centers on Goldwateris leadership.

This

relationship concludes in 1964, the point when Goldwater won the Republican
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presidential nomination, subsequently lost the presidential race, and then
returned to Arizona.

W ithin this framework, only the first three stages are

relevant to the paper’s focus.
After 1964, the movement does go on to at least the first of the final two
stages (maintenance and termination). This progression represents a future area
for study.

Although Goldwater lost his bid for President in

1964, the

conservatives achieved control of the Republican Party. With this takeover, the
movement entered the maintenance stage and new leaders stepped in and
former movement leaders stepped aside (e.g. Goldwater lost the presidential
nomination and, in seeking the nomination, gave up his Senate seat until 1968
when he won the retiring Carl Hayden’s seat). To illustrate the achievement of
stage four, the following two examples exemplify the right’s newfound influence
and its lasting power.
The first example is the 1968 presidential contest.
Republican nomination,

To obtain the

Richard Nixon knew “that he could not win the

nomination without conservative support” and “set out to woo the Right even
before he announced his candidacy” (Brennan, 1995, p. 122). To members of
the right, Nixon’s attention to party conservatives represented a “welcome break
with the ‘me-too,’ ‘yes-but’ school of Republicanism of the years of frustration and
apology” (Hodgson, 1996, p. 120). As an illustration of the right’s ascendancy to
power in the Republican Party, the 1968 nomination is succinctly described in the
following quote:
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The 1968 nomination battle between Nixon and Reagan indicated how far
the Republican Party had shifted to the right. From the quarrelsome, tiny
band of true believers who had attempted to nominate Goldwater in 1960,
conservatives had expanded and organized a movement that drafted a
presidential candidate in 1964 and played the decisive role in choosing a
nominee in 1968.
They [the conservatives] used their growing
organizational strength and public appeal to decide the nomination in 1968
after the politically astute Nixon ran on a conservative platform. (Brennan,
1995, p. 138)
A second example confirming the conservatives’ lasting influence is seen
in the 1980 presidential race.

The consen/atives’ influence was such that the

party’s nominee, Ronald Reagan, was one of their own (Brennan, 1995, p. 1).
Reagan was a staunch conservative whose credentials included “a highly
acclaimed speech supporting Goldwater” (Brennan, 1995, pp. 124) at the 1964
convention (that introduced him as a conservative spokesman), and having
forced Nixon to the right in the 1968 presidential election with his last minute
candidacy {Brennan 1995: 124-127).

Issue 2
The study applicable to Goldwater as a m ovement leader is Herbert W.
Simons’ “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for
Social Movements” (1970). In this analysis, Simons’ defines a movement leader
as one who meets the following characteristics.
1. The leader “must attract, maintain, and mold workers (i.e., followers)
into an efficiently organized unit” and the movement’s success is
dependent on “loyalty to its leadership.” (Simons, 1970, p. 3)
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2. The leader both “must secure adoption of their product by the larger
structure,” and insist that a “new order and a vast regeneration of
values are necessary to smite the agents of the old and to provide
happiness, harmony, and stability.” (Simons, 1970, p. 4)
3. Leaders “must react to resistance generated by the larger structure.”
(Simons, 1970, p. 4)

According to Simons, the establishment, in

response to a movement against the power structure, will do one of
two things.

First, it may incorporate the movement’s demands or

promise to act on them. Their second option is to come down strong
against the movement. The movement’s leader must be able to adjust
to any actions and take advantage of any overreactions.
Simons’ theory is useful in this paper for two reasons. First, Goldwateris
rise and acceptance were rhetorically driven.

He expressed his ideas and

attracted supporters via books, newspaper columns, and speeches.

Second,

Simons argues that a movement’s leader must be able to adjust to any actions
and take advantage of any overreactions.

One of the reasons Goldwater was

able to attain his position as the conservative leader and maintain his following
was his ability to m a ki adjustments to the actions of the establishment.

For

instance, when the establishment publicly described Goldwater and his followers
as extremists and fanatics during the 1964 Republican convention, Goldwater
mobilized his following and, once in control, shut cut any possibility of their
participation in the makeover of the Party establishment.
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In summary, Chapter 2 has defined the theories to be used to outline a
social movement and a movement leader.

Using the methodology described

above as an apparatus, the paper will ascertain if (1) the dissident right of the
GOP during the 50s and early 60s was a social movement and (2) if Goldwater,
as the leader of the right, meets the definition of a movement leader.

In the

following chapter, the paper will review the historical events of the fifties and
early sixties that set the stage for the ascendancy of the right and provoked it to
action.
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CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

As mentioned In Chapter 1, one of the factors that galvanized the right to
wrest control of the Republican Party was a set of pivotal events during the
1950s and early 1960s and the establishment’s responses to those events.
Following is a discussion of these incidents and how they affected the division
between the party’s ruling establishment and the conservative wing.
The following events and the related actions of the establishment resulted
in alienating the right and demonstrated a disregard of its ideas and input. The
establishment’s responses, because of their tendency to view the right as a
fringe group, were a rejection of any potential compromise with the conservatives
(Brennan, 1995, p. 4). The culmination of these events and actions was a feeling
among the right wing that its ideas and candidates were being neglected and
ignored by the establishment.
A listing of the events that hardened the consen/atives’ resolve and
demonstrated the establishment’s dismissal of the right wing is provided on the
following time line. These events include the Korean War, the 1952 Republican
Convention nominating process, the actions of the Eisenhower Administration,
the 1958 mid-term elections, and the 1960 presidential primaries.
28
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Historical Event Timeline
1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1962-1960
KoraanWar
1958
ifid-tann
alectlons

???
General MacAfthur

.

race

\m m m m s ii.
laeo

elections
1952 Republican
Convention

The Korean W ar
Conservatives were generally impressed with President Truman’s initial
reaction when the North Korean Army invaded South Korea in June of 1950.
They applauded as he promptly ordered American troops to the Korean theater.
Additionally, even given a few initial setbacks of United Nations troops, the right
was encouraged with General Douglas MacArthuris rout of the North Korean
Army at Inchon on September 5, and with the administration’s subsequent stated
goal of a reunited Korea through free elections (Reinhard, 1983, p. 69).
However, the sentiment did not last.

By late November, the Chinese

entered the war and helped the North Korean Arm y drive United Nations troops
deep into South Korea. The Chinese participation changed the scope of the war
in the administration’s eyes and brought about a change in its strategy. Now the
administration’s objective was limited “only to a free South Korea” (Reinhard,
1983, p. 69).

The right renounced this aim of limitation as they called on the
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administration to either commit to what the right now viewed as a full-fledged
Sino-American war or to depart Korea completely.
MacArthur also rejected the administration’s limitation strategy.

He

strongly requested authority to confront the Chinese through such strategies as
“blockading the Chinese coast, bombing Chinese targets, and using Chinese
nationalist troops” (Reinhard, 1983, p. 69).

When he was refused, MacArthur

took his complaints to the House Republican leader, Joseph Martin.

When

Martin subsequently made public MacArthuris criticisms, Truman stripped the
general of his command.
The right was outraged. For conservatives, MacArthur echoed their belief
that America should pursue victory, not limited action.

Some conservatives

believed that the general was fired because he sought and could achieve a
military victory.

As Captain Eddie Rickenbacker opined, “General MacArthur,

with victory within his grasp, was fired, and we lost the only war in our history”
(quoted in Kolkey, 1983, pp. 21-22). In 1961, Major General Edwin W alker called
MacArthuris firing “a fuming point in our country’s history and an obvious
censorship of the determination to win” (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 22).
As the war and the administration’s policy of limitation progressed, the
right wing became further infuriated when Truman decided to send American
troops to Europe as part of the United States’ commitment to NATO. Trum an’s
action bewildered conservatives-why strengthen America’s troop position in
Europe when in Korea, the Chinese were overrunning the Army?
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By the war’s end in 1953, consen/atives felt that the administration’s war
strategy, its treatment of General Douglas MacArthur in his quest to win the war,
the results of the Korean War, and the Republican establishment’s endorsement
of these actions were scandalous and unpatriotic.

As a result, the right was

disturbed and irritated by the actions of the Truman administration and the
Republican Party establishment. As conservatives saw it, the war cost the lives
of more than 50,000 American soldiers (Goldwater, 1988, p. 113) and ended on
terms that benefited the enemy. Goldwater observed, “Until 1950, America had
never lost a shooting war” and “with victory in our hands, we chose instead the
bittemess of stalemate” (Goldwater, 1962, p. 31).

He elaborated on this

statement in his autobiography, “W e did not try to win the war in Korea. It was
the first time in history that an American President sent men into battle and tied
their hands” (Goldwater, 1988, p. 113).

In addition, conservatives viewed the

govemment’s war strategy as evidence of the Democratic administration’s and
Republican Party establishment’s reluctance to confront communism, even given
America’s military superiority.

The 1952 Republican Convention
Another event that angered the right wing was the 1952 presidential
convention. Since 1940, the right had watched as liberal Republican nominees
(Willkie in 1940 and Dewey in 1944 and 1948) were selected due to their close
ties to the establishment and

because “the Establishment of the

East

Coast...dominated the conventions of the Republican Party” (White, 1966, p. 88).
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In 1952, though, consen/atives believed their party had a good chance to take
over the White House and that a conservative candidate, specifically Senator
Robert Taft, would be the nominee.
However, in 1952 the Eastem establishment wanted as the Republican
candidate. General Dwight D. Eisenhower - a well known, non-partisan war hero.
To ensure Eisenhower’s nomination, the establishment worked the delegates in
whatever way possible to lock up votes. The efforts included such actions as
spreading the idea that Taft could not win the general election, threatening
delegates with loss of state jobs and loans, and bribing conventioneers. The last
action is recounted in a 1964 conversation between then Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey and then President Lyndon B. Johnson:
Humphrey: I think it may, if he [Goldwater] hasn’t got it [the Republican
nomination] locked up and I doubt that he’s got it really locked
up. The big money in the East,’ you know Mr. President,
could move in as they’ve done before.
LBJ:
I’ve seen 'em do it, like that '52, when Taft had Pennsylvania
and Fine arrived strong fo r Taft and the next moming, when
steel got through with him, he tumed and flipped.^
’ Meaning Eastem Wall Street Republican interests.
^At the 1952 Republican convention in Chicago, Pennsylvania steel
interests helped push Govemor John Fine from backing Robert Taft to
Eisenhower. (Beschloss, 1997, p. 420)
The tactics worked.

Eisenhower won the nomination.

As described by

White, ‘The [Eastemers] who had imposed Willkie in 1940, won the nomination
for Deweyin 1944 and 1948, frustrated Taft and installed Eisenhower in 1952”
(1966, p. 89).

Hodgson comes to the same conclusion in his study of the right’s

ascendancy, ‘Taft was passed over again in favor of the candidate [Eisenhower]
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the Eastem Republicans had cleverly brought in because he could win and they
knew that one of their own could not” (1996, p. 50).
As a result, the right wing again felt jilted. After losing the nomination to
Eisenhower, Taft stated that “every Republican candidate for President since
1936 has been nominated by the Chase Bank” (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 22).
Political analyst Morris Bealle observed that the “nomination was bought, stolen,
bribed and blackmailed from the popular choice” (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 24).

The Eisenhower Administration
The frustration of the right that resulted from Eisenhower’s nomination was
compounded by the actions of his administration during its two terms.

Initially,

the right felt as if it would be given some input by the nominee. Eisenhower and
Taft met after the convention and the former agreed to promote a conservative
agenda in retum for Taft's blessings (Kolkey, 1983, p. 27).

Eisenhower then

went on to win the election promising a conservative administration.
Still, even given his pledges, conservatives realized Eisenhower would not
be stalwart toward their doctrine. As Kolkey (1983) comments:
[conservatives] held no illusions about General Eisenhower as the GOP
standard-bearer. He remained a very poor substitute for the beloved Taft.
In addition, even as a military hero Eisenhower ranked well below the
stature of the legendary General Douglas MacArthur. (p. 24)
Yet, Eisenhower’s promises were enough to give most conservatives
some hope. Goldwater supported Eisenhower over Taft at the 1952 Republican
convention. He felt “that Ike was a fresh political personality, he could win, and
the party needed a new beginning” (Goldwater, 1988, p. 96). And even into his
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first term, Eisenhower’s statements continued to satisfy Goldwater. As noted by
Goldberg (1995) in his study of Goldwater:
President Eisenhower’s call for “dynamic conservatism” cheered
Goldwater. The Arizona senator approved of the administration’s efforts
to restrain spending, pare bureaucracy, and reduce govemment
competition with private industry, especially in the public power area. (p.
101 )

However the right’s mood ultimately tumed. By the time Eisenhower’s two
terms ended, conservatives were frustrated.

As sociologist Daniel Bell stated,

“eight years of moderation proved more frustrating than twenty years of
opposition” (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 27).
The right was disappointed on two fronts. First, instead of dissembling the
programs of the New Deal, Eisenhower left them intact, focusing instead on
controlling costs and bureaucracy. This non-action allowed New Deal programs
to become further entrenched in society.

Goldberg notes that “ Eisenhower

preserved the welfare state and, in accepting the expanded federal role in social
and economic affairs, legitimized and consolidated liberal programs” (Goldberg,
1995, p. 105).
Taft soundly expressed the right’s dissatisfaction along these lines.

In

responding to the administration’s announcement that it would be unable to
balance its budget, he fumed to Eisenhower: “With a program like this, we’ll
never elect a Republican congress in 1954.
road Truman traveled.

You’re taking us down the same

It’s a repudiation of everything we promised in the

campaign” (Reinhard, 1983, p. 103).
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Goldwater also expressed dissatisfaction with Eisenhower’s promise
breaking and spending. In addition to feeling that Eisenhower had let down both
conservatives and party principles (Goldberg, 1995, p. 105), Goldwater was
dismayed by the administration’s actions. As he recounts in his autobiography:
I just didn’t understand Ike. During the 1952 campaign he had said, in the
clearest terms agreeing with Ohio senator Robert Taft, that he’d reduce
federal outlays to $60 billion by fiscal 1955. Yet he proposed to spend
nearly $11 billion more than that in 1957. We were not at war, nor did the
country face any national emergency necessitating such spending.
(Goldwater, 1988, p. 109)
The second front that frustrated the right was the perception that the
party’s Eastem establishment was manipulating the administration and providing
it with “me-too” advice. To conservatives, the establishment was promoting its
self-interests and not those of the party or the country. As seen by Goldwater
(1988):
They [the establishment] would, for example, support federal white-collar
welfare while condemning welfare waste among the poor. More and
more, they were joining the Democrats and bigger govemment for a larger
slice of the federal pie. They called themselves Republicans but sought a
GOP-run govemment not to lessen its intrusion on all our lives but to
control more of how the federal establishment spent its funds....They
wanted the big to get bigger and had abandoned the rest of us. (p. 116)
The right’s frustration culminated in 1957.

By this time, conservatives

were vexed with the administration’s leadership.

Goldwater in particular was

annoyed with Eisenhower’s lack of action against the communists in the
Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and “had grown impatient with the president over
patronage issues and the administration’s affirmation of New and Fair Deal
programs” (Goldberg, 1995, p. 118).

Thus, when the administration’s $71.8
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billion 1958 budget was presented in April, Goldwater, in what was not an easy
task for him, publicly confronted the administration on the Senate floor.

He

delivered a strongly worded speech that railed against the proposed programs to such a degree that the incident caused a gap in his relationship with
Eisenhower that was never bridged.’
In his speech, Goldwater dissented with the President’s proposed budget,
denouncing it as a “dimestore New Deal” (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 28) that
demonstrated that the administration “had been lured by the siren song of
socialism’” (“The Republican split", 1957, p. 26).
outlined

the

administration’s

broken

campaign

programs,

and

promises,
his

From the Floor, Goldwater

his

interpretation

bewilderment
of the

with

the

principles

the

administration was “peddling.”
A $71.7 billion budget not only shocks me, but it weakens my faith in the
constant assurances we have received from this administration that its
goal is to cut spending, balance the budget, reduce the national debt, cut
taxes— in short, to live within our means.
How long can we can we in Washington bask in the shade of the
money tree, thinking that somewhere in its branches grow dollar bills
which we are going to use to place the rest of the world in this
intemational welfare state in which we find ourselves.
Its [the administration and the Party establishment] spokesmen are
peddlers of the philosophy that the Constitution is outmoded, that states’
rights are void, and that the only hope fo r the future of these United States
is for our people to be federally bom, federally housed, federally clothed,
federally supported in their occupations, and to be buried in a federal box
in a federal cemetery, (quoted in Wood & Smith, 1961, pp. 139-141)
In addition to its rhetoric, there was an additional important implication that
stemmed from Goldwateris speech.

Namely, the speech was one in a line of

more frequent comments from him dissenting with the administration.
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result, Goldwater was beginning to take shape, both nationally and among the
right, as a viable and attractive conservative alternative to the establishment's
Republicanism. This attention was evidenced by Time's declaration, immediately
following the budget speech, of Goldwater as the right's “most articulate
spokesman” ("The Republican split", 1957, p. 26).

As explained by Goldberg,

Goldwateris “dissent, fused with a vision of change and new possibilities, quickly
became the rallying cry for a generation of conservatives and made him a
national figure” (Goldberg, 1995, p. 119).
In addition to politicians, conservatives outside the Capitol were also
disappointed with the administration. Among the media, William F. Buckley, Jr.
complained that “Eisenhower did nothing whatever for the Republican Party;
nothing to develop a Republican philosophy of govemment; nothing to catalyze a
meaty American conservatism” (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 27).
Finally, in 1959, one more act of note by Goldwater occurred that helped
solidify his standing among conservatives as a man willing to stand for their
principles.

As opposed to the actions described above, this one was done in

tandem with the administration.
In April 1959, Senators John F. Kennedy and Sam Ervin proposed a bill
aiming to help control union excesses.

Against unanimous support in the

Senate, Goldwater was adamant in his belief that the bill did not do what it was
purported to do.

With Eisenhower’s Secretary of Labor providing direct input,

Goldwater attempted to attach 18 amendments to rectify problem on the bill, all
of which were rejected.
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Goldwater then voted alone as the bill passed the Senate 90 to 1.

He

called it a “’panty-waist bill’ that was ‘like a flea bite to a bull elephant’” (Goldberg,
1995, p. 135). Goldwater felt the bill lacked any substantive measures to protect
against abuses of the unions, which he felt “now stand across the nation like a
colossus and no power outside of Govemment can compare with them in
magnitude” (quoted in Goldberg, 1995, p. 135).
Summoned by Eisenhower to explain his position, Goldwater willingly
outlined the areas he felt were lacking. Eisenhower had his strategists re-study
the bill and subsequently spoke on national television explaining the bill’s faults
and calling on Congress to pass a more comprehensive bill. In September, the
Senate reversed its previous support of the Kennedy-Ervin bill and voted 95 to 2
in support of a revised bill that contained most of Goldwateris suggested
revisions.

1958 Elections
Nationwide, the 1958 elections were disastrous to Republicans, the worst
since 1936.

In the House of Representatives, Democrats took forty-nine

Republican seats while only one Republican won a Democratic seat. Among the
Senate, Democrats won thirteen Republican seats versus no loss of Democratic
seats. Additionally, in state elections. Republicans lost five govemorships and
approximately 700 legislative seats.

As L. Brent Bozell observed: “ Let us

conservatives not look for the silver lining, there is none” (quoted in Reinhard,
1983, p. 147).
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However, the elections are important in the study of the conservatives’ rise
in that they had a “defining effect for Goldwater and the Republican Party”
(Goldberg, 1995, p. 132).

This consequential aftermath resulted from two

events.
First, Senator William Knowland, a Senate’s conservative leader and the
right wing’s best hope for the 1960 presidential nomination lost his bid for
Govemor of Califomia. Knowland’s loss effectively ended his political career and
national standing as a Republican political leader.
Second, Goldwater decisively won re-election in Arizona despite the
national Democratic landslide (he was the only Republican Senator west of the
Mississippi River to win) and an influx of union funds targeting his defeat. As
with his initial election in 1952, Goldwater defeated Ernest McFarland. In 1952,
Goldwater defeated McFarland when he was the Senate Majority Leader. Then
in 1958, McFarland was the Govemor of Arizona when he challenged Goldwater.
In the latter scenario, Goldwateris victory stood out among conservatives.

He

was a Republican who not only retained his Senate seat as other Republicans
were losing theirs, but did so against a Democratic trend, by standing up to the
unions, and defeating a strong Democratic opponent in a state where Democrats
outnumbered Republicans two-to-one (Goldberg, 1995, p. 125).
As a result of his victory, Goldwater was being seen by some as the
recognized leader of the right. Knowland had been defeated and Goldwater had
decisively survived a Democratic onslaught amid a Republican rout. Additionally,
his success further solidified the right wing’s view that Goldwateris agenda, and
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not the establishment’s, was the winning strategy for Republicans. As Human
Events declared, Goldwater was the “Man of the Hour” (Brennan, 1995, p. 30).

1960
Various events in 1960 played a pivotal role in shaping the upcoming
consen/ative insurgency. The consequences resulting from these events gave
the right the impetus needed to finally take action within the Party to make its
voices heard. The results also made clear who would be the leader for its cause.
The first important event was the race between New York Govemor
Nelson Rockefeller and Vice President Richard Nixon fo r the Republican
presidential nomination. For conservatives, Nixon was the choice. Even though
he had never been a favorite of the right wing, he was more palatable than the
liberal Rockefeller, “the hated bankroller of the Eastem Liberal Establishment”
(Kolkey, 1983, p. 30). Goldwater accentuated the differences between the right
and Rockefeller in 1959. At the Westem Republican Conference he declared, in
response to Rockefeller’s presence there, “My kind of Republican party is
committed to a free state, limited central power, a reduction in bureaucracy, and
a balanced budget” (quoted in Stengel, 1986, p. 24).
An additional occurrence in 1960 that was important in shaping the
Republican Party was Nixon’s mid-convention acquiescence to Rockefeller as
respects the letter’s view on the direction of the Republican’s election platform.
After hearing of dissension by Rockefeller’s strategists,

Nixon asked an

intermediary to telephone Rockefeller to request a meeting between the Vice-
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President and Rockefeller.

After conferring with his strategists, Rockefeller’s

responded by standing firm with tough demands for a meeting, confident that the
Vice-President would capitulate. In his study of the 1960 election. White detailed
the terms:
That Nixon telephone Rockefeller personally with his request for a
meeting: that they meet at the Rockefeller apartment, not at Brownell’s
house; that the meeting be secret and later be announced in a press
release from the Govemor [Rockefeller], not Nixon; that the meeting
clearly be announced as taking place at the Vice-President’s request.
(1961, p. 197)
In an action that was unknown to his entourage, Nixon acceded to all of
Rockefeller’s demands and agreed to fly that same night to New York.

After

meeting from 7:30 in the evening to 3:20 in the moming, Nixon came away
unsuccessful in his bid to convince Rockefeller to be his Vice-President and
having agreed to accommodations in the Republican plank that satisfied
Rockefeller (White, 1961, pp. 197-198). Less than two hours after the end of the
meeting, Nixon finally informed his office what occurred and the Rockefeller team
released a national press release that began: ‘The Vice-President and I met
today at my home in New York City.

The meeting took place at the Vice-

President’s request” (White, 1961, p. 198).
The meeting and agreement, which became known as the “Fifth Avenue
Compact,” (named so after Rockefeller’s Manhattan address) greatly infuriated
and alienated the right for two reasons.

First, they were not consulted.

Goldwater had talked to Nixon the moming when he decided to telephone
Brownell and was not told anything about the upcoming phone call.
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had again been pushed aside as the Eastem establishment continued its
imposition of its ideological will at a Party convention. Second, by his going to
Rockefeller, Nixon was seen as subordinating himself to the establishment in
order to compromise with them.
Goldwater expressed the views of the right. He bitterly called the pact a
“surrender” and labeled it the “Munich of the Republican Party” (White, 1961, p.
199).
Consequently, a void was created among conservatives since they had no
leader or candidate. Confidence in Nixon was lost and old leaders were either
dead (Taft) or gone (Knowland). The natural selection to fill this void was Barry
Goldwater. As noted in the National Review, the right had “no organization or
even personal vehicle around which to build...the phenomenon of Barry
Goldwater may change that” (quoted in Kolkey, 1983, p. 175).
Ultimately,

the

pact,

the

conservatives’

anger

with

it,

and

the

conservatives’ need for a leader all contributed to the final paramount event in
19 6 0 -a “Goldwater for President” movement. At the convention, the Arizona and
South Carolina delegations (against Goldwateris request) placed Goldwateris
name in nomination. As a result, Goldwater was able to address the convention
in order to withdraw his name and release his delegates.

This opportunity

provided an additional occasion for Goldwater to be introduced to a national
Republican audience and solidify his position as the emerging leader among
consen/atives. The speech also provided Goldwater a chance to be seen as a
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dynamic leader, as he made a plea for party unity by telling his followers to “grow
up” and support Nixon:
We are conservatives. This great Republican Party is our historic house.
This is our home...We have lost election after election in this country in
the last several years because conservative Republicans get mad and
stay home. Now I implore you. Forget it! We’ve had our chance, and I
think the conservatives have made a splendid showing at this
convention....Let’s grow up conservatives. Let’s if we want to take this
party back - and I think we can someday - let’s get to work.” ("Text of
Goldwateris withdraw! speech", 1961, p. 14)
Goldwater, for his part, led the way in supporting Nixon over Kennedy.
Going into the November election, Goldwater made 126 speeches in 26 states
(Brennan, 1995, p. 36). Though the right also moved ahead supporting Nixon
over Kennedy, the support was halfhearted.

To conservatives, Nixon versus

Kennedy represented the lesser of two evils. As William F. Buckley wrote in the
National Review. "We are ready for either President Nixon or President Kennedy;
our bomb shelters are in good order" (Buckley, 1960, p. 234).
The 1960 elections ended up being a close race. On election night, the
lead jostled back and forth between the two candidates until Nixon finally
conceded to Kennedy (Brennan, 1995, p. 37). To conservatives, the reason for
the defeat was obvious.

The right blamed Nixon’s loss on his "pulling his

punches," especially in light of his pact with Rockefeller. The conservative press
concurred; National Review’s editors stated that Nixon tried too much to be like
his opponent and that the democrats intimidated him (Brennan, 1995, p. 39).
Goldwater commented that Nixon was another "me-too" candidate.
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However, in the face of their party’s defeat, the right was strengthened in
its resolve to develop a strategy for 1964, and one that would not be
circumvented by another “me-too” candidate. Goldwater fired the first volley of
the 1964 campaign by announcing that he was going to work for the Party toward
the selection of a nominee (although not himself).

And in a not so veiled

reference to Rockefeller, Goldwater stated that he wanted a candidate who
would be a conservative, not someone who would “ape the New Deal" (quoted in
Reinhard, 1983, p. 156). Thus, after years as the ignored and abused minority,
conservative activists were resolute in their determination to follow Goldwateris
words and take control of their party.
A primary reason for the right’s renewed energy was its recognition of a
new and exciting leader.

Throughout 1960,

Goldwateris national name

recognition and his standing among conservatives as a leading spokesman had
grown. Critical to this growth were the following factors.
First, Goldwater continued to serve as the chairman of the Senate
Republican campaign committee. Through this position, he traveled the nation
stumping

for

Republicans,

espousing

his

conservative

philosophy,

and

enhancing his national exposure.
Second, 1960 saw the start of a successful literary career that resulted in
increased exposure for Goldwater and his views.

In January, the Los Angeles

Times asked Goldwater to write a thrice-weekly column entitled "How Do You
Stand Sir?" (Shadegg, 1965, p. 25). In April the column became syndicated and
by the end of the year it was appearing in 80 newspapers (at its end in 1962, the
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column was seen In over 140 newspapers (Shadegg, 1965, p. 27)). Soon after
the start of the column, Goldwater was asked to write a book summarizing
conservative philosophy.

The Conscience of a Conservative was a “runaway

success” that sold 3.5 million copies by 1964 (Hodgson, 1996, p. 97).
Finally, Goldwateris position as the conservative’s choice to carry its torch
toward the next election was solidified with his appearance and speech at the
convention.

Commenting on his performance, Brennan states that Goldwater

“inspired conservative faith and raised hopes for the future (1995, p. 38). W hite
observes that "One could almost fix the moment of its [Goldwateris place as
nominee] at the Chicago convention in 1960” (1966, p. 112).

Good looking,

photogenic, rugged, bold, indomitable, and a stalwart conservative, Goldwater
was the natural selection.

For conservatives, “here, at last, was an electable

conservative Republican” and who, as opposed to Taft and Nixon, “did not suffer
from a loser’s image” (Brennan, 1995, p. 32).

His message resonated among

those who were concerned with too much governmental control, a balanced
budget

The Road to 1964
After the 1960 election, Goldwater actively spent the next few years
stumping for the conservative cause.

From talk shows to the lecture circuit to

magazines and newspapers, Goldwater became a salesman for the right's views.
"Tall and tan with a handsome, ruggedly sculptured face, dark hom-rimmed
glasses, and wavy gray-white hair, Goldwater looked like a President" (Reinhard,
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1983, p. 159). In addition, he had charm and vigor and was a jet pilot (he was a
Major in the Air Force Reserve). W ith these attributes, Goldwater fast became
the GOP's most popular speaker (Reinhard, 1983, p. 159).
At every opportunity to express himself, Goldwater never deviated from
his staunch, pre-New Deal, conservative views. And he did so without thought to
the political fallout. He wanted less government intrusion in people's lives, but he
felt his views were different from the standard conservative blanket opposition to
govemment programs. "I try to be fo r something," Goldwater said "I d o nt just
say I’m against Federal aid—period. I say let the federal govemment reduce its
costs and its burdens, and allow state and local governments to assure more
responsibility" (quoted in Reinhard, 1983, p. 162). Goldwater claimed he could
easily run for President on Franklin D. Roosevelt's platform-albeit his 1932
platform that called for a strong currency, less spending, a balanced budget, and
a smaller federal payroll.
In a 1961 profile. Time noted Goldwateris emerging presence and
influence in the Party. Time called Goldwater the "GOP salesman supreme and
the political phenomenon of 1961." In addition, the article added that whether or
not he would be the 1964 Republican candidate, he “will have plenty to say about
the tone and spirit of his party's next platform, and even more to say about who
will be standing on it" ("Republicans: Salesman fora cause", 1961, p. 16).
As a result of his exposure, Goldwater, by mid 1961, had fast become the
candidate of choice for the GOP. A poll of 1960 convention delegates placed
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Goldwater as the choice for President with 49.3% versus a combined 44.4% for
Nixon or Rockefeller (Reinhard, 1983, p. 159).
However, Goldwater did not consider himself a candidate.

In June of

1961, when asked about his desire for the White House, Goldwater replied "I
have no plans for it. I have no staff for it, and no ambition for it. Besides I've got
a Jewish name...I d o n t know if the country is ready for me" (quoted in
"Republicans: Salesman for a cause", 1961, p. 16). Goldwateris lack of desire
for the position is emphasized in his discounting of his and the other leading
Republican candidates' chances: "Rockefeller would be a hard sell to the Middle
West. I would be a hard sell to the Eastem seaboard. Nixon would be a hard
sell to everybody" (quoted in "Republicans: Salesman for a cause", 1961, p. 16).
As early as 1961, the talk of Goldwater being a leading candidate fo r the
1964 GOP nomination was prevalent enough to have reached President
Kennedy. As recounted by Goldwater, when summoned to the White House by
President Kennedy to discuss privately the results of the first phase of the Bay of
Pigs invasion, the first words from the President were, "So you want this fucking
job, do you?" (Goldwater, 1979, p. 137)

Goldwater replied that Kennedy had

been reading too many conservative newspapers.
In addition to Goldwateris efforts, two events in the political arena also
helped strengthen Goldwateris position as a leading prospect for the GOP
nomination.

First, the Republican members of Congress elected in the early

sixties were increasingly conservative and regarded Goldwater as an advocate
for their conservatism.

The newly elected conservatives faulted the GOP
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leadership for being too moderate and not offering Republican altematives in
response to Kennedy's proposals. As White (1966) observes, "the new mood of
the [consen/atives] insisted that the [government's] course of affairs be reversed”
(p. 113).
The second event resulted in one less potential GOP candidate for 1964.
In 1962, Nixon lost in his bid for the governorship of Califomia. Nixon entered
the race to solidify his political base that was needed if he was to make a run for
the 1964 presidential race.

However, Nixon lost to the popular Democratic

incumbent Pat Brown. After the loss, Nixon did not help his already dim chances
for 1964 when he proclaimed to the press that they "wouldn't have Nixon to kick
around anymore, because...this is my last press conference" (quoted in Brennan,
1995, p. 52).
By the late fall of 1963, Goldwater had decided to run against Kennedy.
His national appeal had grown.

Democratic Senator William Proxmire of

Wisconsin commented that his office received virtually the same number of
letters praising Goldwater as praising Kennedy (Matthews, 1997, p. 663).
addition, poll numbers supported a run.

In

The numbers indicated a surging

Goldwater popularity (between February, 1963 and November, 1963, with
Goldwater still undecided, his support for a presidential bid against Kennedy
narrowed from a forty point deficit to a sixteen point deficit), as well as a
vulnerable Kennedy.

As respects the latter, by October, 1963, Kennedy’s

approval ratings had shrunk to 57%; 66% of the public disapproved of his
spending record; his popularity had dropped by 16% in the East and even further
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in the Midwest, far West, and South; and, among Catholics and Democrats,
Kennedy’s support had fallen by 11 points (Matthews, 1997, pp. 663-664).
The poll numbers and Goldwateris viability as a candidate were not lost on
others. The Kennedy administration was concerned with possible defeat in the
South and a tight race in other states. Journalist Stewart Alsop commented that
“among the political professional, [there was] a feeling that Goldwater just might
make it all the way to the White House” (Matthews, 1997, p. 664).
Another factor entering into Goldwateris decision to run against Kennedy,
was that he was eager to do so. Even though the two differed politically, they
were friends. Goldwater stated he “had developed a warm personal relationship
with John F. Kennedy” (Goldwater, 1979, p. 137).

In turn, “Kennedy had told

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. that Goldwater was a man of decency and character”’
(Brennan, 1995, p. 70). Both had served in W orld W ar II and they had worked
together as Senators investigating unions in the fifties.

In addition, Goldwater

looked forward to providing the country with an issues-oriented campaign. The
two had even laid out plans for a Lincoln-Douglas style debate tour across the
country that emphasized issues and Democrat vs. Republican philosophies as
opposed to insults of character.
Ultimately, Goldwateris vision for the 1964 presidential race took a tragic
tum as Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.

In Kennedy’s place was Lyndon

Johnson. Losing his taste for the 1964 bid, Goldwater initially withdrew from the
race. One reason was that he had detested Johnson. Goldwater thought he was
a “dirty fighter” and a “master of manipulation” (Matthews, 1997, p. 665).
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political race, Goldwater felt “that it was necessary to oppose, but to oppose
without hate,” and he felt Johnson was “incapable of opposing without hate”
(Goldwater, 1979, p. 160). Additionally, Johnson’s consen/ative reputation took
away Goldwateris edge in the South and the border states (e.g., Texas, North
Carolina, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Virginia).
As a final impetus to withdraw, Goldwater believed that a grieving country would
not be in the mood to change presidents.
After consideration though, Goldwater thought that if he dropped out of the
race, he would be disappointing the people who had supported and worked for
him so far. He also questioned who the Party would tum to in his place and the
resulting direction the Party would take.

Thus, not wishing to abandon

supporters or a cause, Goldwater decided to run, even realizing that he had
limited chances of winning. Goldwateris desire to support the right’s cause, even
in a race he would lose, is noted by Kathleen Hall Jamieson in her study of
presidential campaigns:
If ever there was a campaign in which one candidate sought to win the
election while the other was more interested in winning the point, the 1964
presidential race between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater was that
contest. (Jamieson, 1992, p. 169)
White’s obsen/ations of Gold water’s motives to run in the first place help
shed light on his decision to re-enter a race he did not particularly care for,
against an opponent he did not particularly like:
Essentially, Goldwater thought of himself, and still does, not as a man
prepared to or even desiring to run and administer the govemment of the
United States, but as a leader of a cause. This cause is precious to him;
his loyalty to it is sincere and unblemished. (White, 1966, p. 112)
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Finally, in addition to the above-mentioned components of ‘T h e Road to
1964,” there was an additional factor that contributed to the right’s ascension and
its

seizure of control of the Party’s control.

continued disregard in

the 60 s

Namely, the establishment’s

for the minority faction.

Brennan sums up this

factor effectively in the following:
In fact, liberal Republicans continued to overlook the increasing strength
of the conservative wing. Whether the signs were not as clear then as
they appear today, whether liberals assumed that conservatives would
never gain the strength needed to take control of the party, or whether
liberals arrogantly assumed conservatives would never attempt such a
feat, liberal Republicans tumed a blind eye to conservatives, except
occasionally to disparage them as the “lunatic fringe.” Conservatives,
meanwhile, used these four years to consolidate their membership, to
attempt to root out the more irrational extremist elements from their
movement, and to build an organization to draft their own presidential
candidate, Barry Goldwater. (1995, p. 59)
Thus, the stage was set for the right wing's ascension to power.

The

change in power eventually transpired in 1964 with the first ballot Republican
nomination of the conservatives’ choice, Barry Goldwater, fo r President. His rise
and nomination marked the end of the Eastem establishment’s domination of the
party’s control and the beginning of influence from conservative party members
from the West and the South.
Chapter 3 has chronicled the events surrounding the right’s insurgency
that led to its drive to obtain power of the Party.

In Chapter 4, the paper will

apply to the events described above, the characteristics of a social movement
and a movement leader as defined in the Chapter 2.
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Chapter Notes
’ As a result of their breech, Eisenhower assigned staff members to keep
an eye on comments made by Goldwater regarding him and the administration, a
routine that he maintained even after he left the White House. (Goldberg, 1995,
p. 121)
^From the convention in Chicago, Nixon telephoned Herbert Brownell, a
former Attorney-General, key Eisenhower campaign strategist, and political
confidant of Thomas Dewey. He asked Brownell to contact Rockefeller and relay
that Nixon had no differences with Rockefeller, that he would like to come to New
York immediately from Chicago to talk, and could they meet at Brownell’s house
(neutral ground).
^Similar to a conquering general savoring the spoils of victory. Rockefeller
is described by White as a three hour four-way phone call is initiated at midnight
to inform representatives of Nixon and Rockefeller in Chicago of the agreements:
Nixon, who sat at the desk in Rockefeller’s private study; and
Rockefeller...who lounged, sitting, on his bed in the handsome room that
looks out at night over the twinkling vista beyond Central Park. Nixon
boggling now and again at some portion...difficult to swallow.
Rockefeller...insisting, and Nixon generally yielding. (1961, p. 198)
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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter 2 established the definitions of a social movement and a
movement leader.

The next chapter then chronicled the events surrounding

Goldwateris ascent to movement leader and the conservatives’ ensuing take
over of the Republican Party. Chapter 4 will apply the framework developed in
Chapter 2 to the events outlined in Chapter 3. Using Sillars contention that “each
movement exhibits a pattem of events which can be seen in other movements”
(1980, p. 20), Chapter 4 will assess if there is correlation between the events of
Chapter 3 and the commonalties of movements established in Chapter 2 in order
to judge;
1. Whether the minority conservative faction within the Republican Party
can be identified as a social movement; and,
2. If Goldwater, as the publicly viewed leader of the right wing, can be
described as a social movement leader.

Issue 1
Stewart, Smith and Denton define the recognizable life cycle of a social
movement as consisting of five stages: (1) Genesis, (2) Social Unrest, (3)
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Enthusiastic Mobilization, (4) Maintenance, and (5) Termination. This section will
look at each stage individually in applying historical events from the right’s rise.

Stage 1: Genesis
According to the authors, the genesis of a movement occurs during
peaceful times.

In the case of the right, the imperfections that called the

movement into being (e.g., events surrounding the Korean War, the actions of
the Eisenhower administration and the 1952 Republican convention, etc.) can be
traced to the 1950s, a time of social tranquility, financial prosperity and political
consensus.
Economically, the country was still experiencing the benefits of a post war
industrial boom. As Todd Gitlin writes about the decade in his book The Sixties:
Years of Hope. Days of Rage. “So much of America in the Fifties seemed
content, so many of the old promises redeemed...” (p. 2) and affluence was
“assumed to be a national condition” (p. 12).
Politically, there was a spirit of consensus.

Eisenhower, a “determined

non-ideologue” (Edwards, 1988, p. 58), was decisively elected President in 1952
with broad support from voters of both parties. His victory “herald[ed] a new era
of bipartisanship” (Brennan, 1995, p. 7). Additionally, the political and ideological
strategies of the Eastem establishment controlling the Republican Party did not
call for major societal or economic changes. Ignoring the right’s concerns about
dismantling programs and balancing the budget, the establishment instead
looked toward “following in the tradition of Theodore Roosevelt’s progressivism
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and embraced New Deal-style social and economic programs in the belief that
such policies would alleviate class conflicts [and] lead to economic stability”
(Brennan, 1995, p. 8).
The

period was

also

peaceful

as

respects the

right’s

perceived

imperfections (e.g., abuse of power, inequality, etc.). At the time, there was little
discourse of the conservatives’ consternation, both in the general public and on
the whole with conservatives. Therefore, to many people, the problems didn’t
exist.

To the public, the Republican capture of the presidency represented a

conservative victory and resolution of the party’s disputes. From the right, limited
dialogue was provided to the public of any perceived imperfections. As noted by
Edwards, the decade was a “consen/ative wasteland,” where, “in the spring of
1953, there seemed to be no conservative movement in Am erica” (Edwards,
1988, p. 58).
The scarcity of collective consen/ative discourse regarding imperfections
is evidenced in the lack of right wing think tanks and joumals. As respects the
former, there were none.

Among the latter, there were virtually none, as

opposed to at least eight magazines in which liberal writers could write opinion
pieces (Edwards, 1988, pp. 59,60).

Even between the existing consen/ative

publications, one (Human Events) was a newsletter and the other (The Freeman)
was financially strained.

It wasn’t until late 1955 that another consen/ative

publication entered the market. William F. Buckley’s National Review was first
published in November, 1955.

However, its initial years were lean, and only

toward the end of the decade did the magazine’s achieve a solid base circulation
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of 30,000 (Goldberg, 1995, p. 136) and the justification for Buckley to finally claim
that the magazine was widely accepted as “the voice of American conservatism”
(Edwards, 1988, p. 60).
The lack of organized discourse from conservatives did not mean that
there was a lack of conservative agitation. Indeed, there were a growing number
of conservatives appalled by the actions of the establishment.
effected

members

were

disparate

groups,

both

However, the

geographically

and

philosophically. This separateness kept them from acting as a collective unit. In
his book. To the Right Jerome Himmelstein observes that “by the mid-1950s
“several [conservative] waves of political reaction to the New Deal and its legacy”
did exist, but were “still disorganized and powerless” (p. 63).
As described by Brennan in Turning Right in the Sixties, the factions
ranged from businesspeople in the South and West who “stressed individual
initiative over welfare programs, [and] preferred free enterprise rather than
govemment regulation” (1995, p. 8), to “midwestemers who also felt excluded
from the ‘Establishment’ (1995, p. 8).

Philosophically, the groups included

members who were foreign policy isolationists, to “Asia-Firsters” concerned with
assisting the Far East, particularly with regard to the spread of communism
(communism in the U.S. was a different matter and concern for it was expressed
by establishment members as well as conservatives).

Differing factions also

existed among conservative intellectuals. A sampling of these groups included
“traditionalists”, who “criticized the cult of conformity [in the Western world] and
the emergence of what they labeled as the ‘mass man’” (1995, p. 9);
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conservatives who, although apprehensive about the impending “Big Brother”
state, recognized a role for govemment in community life; and libertarians who
called limited, if any, govemment involvement and for free market economics.
An additional element of Stage 1 described by Stewart, Smith, and Denton
is that the persuasion technique of the movement requires that it define the
movement’s issues.

This component is seen during the early fifties in the

rhetoric of conservative spokespersons.

As Brennan writes, “conservative

writers [and]...editors helped acquaint the public with the philosophical and
practical tenets of conservatism...” (Brennan, p. 11). In particular, this technique
is evident in the discourse of two of the period’s principal sources of conservative
thought— Buckley and Russell Kirk.
Buckley, as editor and founder of National Review, shaped readers’
perceptions of conservative issues. His conservative joumal “was more than just
a chronicler of contemporary events,” it “articulat[ed] conservative grievances”
(Brennan, 1995, p. 11).

As respects Kirk, the use of “defining” rhetoric was

evident in his influential 1953 book The Conservative Mind.’ The result was a
“brilliant distillation of conservative thinking,” a “synthesis of the ideas of some of
the greatest conservative thinkers of the 18*, 19*, and 20* centuries, men like
Edmund Burke, the Adamses, deTocqueville, Disraeli, Brownson, Paul Elmer
More, Santayana” (Edwards, 1988, p. 60).
In terms of their impact on the movement, Buckley and Kirk served as
conservative intellectuals and prophets.

As described by Edwards, Kirk and
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Buckley were, respectively, “the man of ideas, the intellectual, the philosopher;
then the man of interpretation, the journalist, the popularizer” (1988, p. 59).
Stewart, Smith, and Denton also write that movements are evidenced in
Stage 1 by a continuing belief that working within the system will bring about the
changes being called for by the burgeoning movement. Evidence of this trait is
found in Goldwateris actions.

At the 1952 Republican convention, he was a

delegate for Eisenhower, not Taft—even though Taft represented views more in
line with Goldwateris conservative principles.
tenure,

Goldwater “muted

(Himmelstein, 1990, p. 66).

his criticism

In addition, during Eisenhower’s

of the

Republican

administration”

Even after his open break in 1957 with the White

House and the Party’s liberal establishment,^ Goldwater still worked closely with
it to effect changes, as witnessed by his cooperation with the administration to
defeat the Kennedy-Ervin labor reform bill. His support represented Goldwateris
faith in an establishment candidate as someone who would listen to the concerns
and opinions of the minority faction and his belief in the viability of working
through establishment channels.
Eventually, the frustrations of Stage 1 develop until a “triggering effect”
pushes the movement to the second stage of social unrest. The event that was
the catalyst for the right can be traced to the “Fifth Avenue P act’ between Nixon
and Rockefeller during the 1960 Republican convention. Nixon’s “surrender” and
“damned sellout’ to Rockefeller and the “New York "kingmakers’” (Reinhard,
1983, p. 154) infuriated conservatives and spurred them into action against the
establishment.
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Goldwater, particularly incensed with Nixon for reversing a pledge to
endorse a right-to-work plank in the Party platform (Goldberg, 1995, p. 145),
changed his strategy for the convention. He had originally planned to release his
delegates before the opening of the convention in a show of Party unity for
Nixon. After the news of Nixon’s trip surfaced though, Goldwater told his aide
that his prepared statement “could wait” (Goldwater, 1979, p. 112).
Supporters of Goldwater (estimated by Nixon strategist Leonard Hall at
almost 300 delegates (Reinhard, 1983, p. 154)) responded defiantly.

For

example, the Texas delegation voted to release its commitment to Nixon.
However, in an action that laid the groundwork for Stage 2, conservatives at the
delegation “placed [Goldwateris] name in nomination and paraded in support of
their candidate” (Goldberg, 1995, p. 145).^
Goldwater realized that he could not win

the nomination and, taking

advantage of an unexpected opportunity, addressed the convention in order to
withdraw his name. Through his speech, Goldwater was able to make a call for
party unity: ‘This country is too important for anyone’s feelings...to stay home
and not work just because he doesn’t agree” ("Text of Gold water’s withdrawl
speech", 1961, p. 14).

More importantly though, as respects the movement,

Goldwater summoned the members to channel their anger and resentment into
mobilization and action toward taking power of the Party:
conservatives.

“Let’s grow up

Let’s if we want to take this party back—and I think we can

someday— let’s get to work” ("Text of Goldwateris withdrawl speech", 1961, p.
14).
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The description of the 1960 convention as a “triggering event,” that
propelled the movement into Stage 2, is borne out by Theodore H. White and
George Will.

White, in his analysis of the 1960 election, stated “One could

almost fix the moment of [the conservative movement’s] birth at the Chicago
convention of 1960” (1966, p. 112). Will commented that “the 1960s began as a
decade of dissent....in Chicago in 1960, when Arizona’s junior senator strode to
the podium” (Will, 1998, p. M5).
Additionally, the convention confirmed Goldwateris position as the man
movement members would follow in the next stage.

The movement’s

acceptance of Goldwater as its leader is evidenced in the New York Times post
convention declaration: “Now, their [conservatives] hearts belong to Barry”
(quoted in Goldberg, 1995, p. 146). After the disorganization of the fifties, the
1960 convention galvanized the conservatives to work collectively and challenge
the Eastem establishment’s control of the Party.

Stage 2. Social Unrest
Once in the second stage, there are factors that evidence the movement’s
progression.

These include further catalytic events that help propel the

movement to Stage 3, increasing numbers of movement members, some
recognition of the resistance by the establishment (albeit with dismissal of its
significance), and a spirit of organization among the members.

Further, the

rhetoric seen in this stage serves the function of “transforming perceptions of
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reality and society and prescribing courses of action” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p.
85).
In the social unrest stage, movement members start to coalesce,
organize, and speak out.

In addition, the movement creates a manifesto that

identifies problems, the people who caused the problems and solutions to those
problems.

Applying these attributes to the conservative movement, one finds

components of this cycle apparent in the movement.
First, there was greater interest in conservative joumals and publications.
In the early sixties, the readership of the National Review tripled from 30,000 to
90,000 (Himmelstein, 1990, p. 67); Human Events had 50,000 subscribers;
various other conservative publications had total circulation of over 300,000; and
publishing companies such as Henry Regnery and Victor Publishing Company
focussed solely on conservative issues and writers (Goldberg, 1995, p. 136).
Conservative figures also were starting to be published and mass marketed.
Buckley, in addition to his National Review duties began writing a newspaper
column in 1961.

Also, Goldwater published his best selling book The

Conscience of a Conservative.

Co-written with L. Brent Bozell (Buckley's

brother-in-law), the book was a compilation of Goldwateris syndicated column
“How Do You Stand, Sir?” Written by Stephen Shadegg (Goldwateris political
manager), and based on subjects selected by Goldwater, the column appeared
in over 140 newspapers by mid-1961 (Shadegg, 1965, p. 25).

Between 1960

and mid-1961, the book sold 700,000 copies.
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The publication of The Conscience of a Conservative is pivotal to the
study of the right as a movement in that it fulfills an important part of Stewart,
Smith, and Denton’s Stage 2. According to the authors, a movement manifesto
emerges during this stage. In line with the function of the movement’s rhetoric
(“transforming perceptions of reality and society and prescribing courses of
action” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 85)), the movement’s proclamation accomplishes
three objectives-it identifies imperfections, the sources of the imperfections, and
the solutions.
As

respects

the

conservative

movement.

Conservative represents the movement’s manifesto.

The

Conscience

of

a

Following the above

described direction, Goldwateris declaration serves three functions:

(1 ) “to describe the problem."
communism, the welfare state, increased taxes and spending, and
deterioration of states’ rights

(2) “to identifv the devils.” and
communists, unions, and big govemment

(3) “to prescribe the solution...” (Stewart, et al.. 1994. p. 22)
"reduce

and

to

localize

govem m entai

activities

and

responsibilities....protect private property,” and “oppose and defeat communism”
(Hammerback, 1987, p. 174)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63
A further element of Stage 2 that the movement exhibited is a coalescing
and organization of members during the early sixties.

A sampling of formal

groups included Americans for Constitutional Action, the Conservative Society of
America, the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation, and Defenders of the American
Constitution.

Additionally, the ranks of the movement started to include

supporters of national stature and popularity.

To potential members, these

supporters added an air of credibility and legitimacy to the movement.

The

supporters included scholars (Clarence Manion,^ the retired Dean of Notre Dame
Law School); politicians (former Senator William Knowland agreed to head
Goldwateris Califomia primary campaign); celebrities (John Wayne, Efrem
Zimbalist, Jr., and Hedda Hopper); and business leaders (Leonard Firestone,
Justin Dart, and Jack Wamer).
Within

the

emergence

of

conservative

organizations,

especially strong on the country’s college campuses.

growth

was

In a 1961 article titled

“Campus Conservatives,” Time focused on the “high

birth rate” of new

conservative campus organizations and the revitalization of old ones across the
country—even at places such as “Wisconsin, Yale, Harvard, and other academic
bastions of liberalism” (Goldberg, 1995, p. 136). Specific organizations cited by
Time were Milione’s Intercollegiate Society of Individualists and the Young
Americans for Freedom (YAF). The former had grown to 12,000 members from
its founding in 1953, while the latter had gained 21,000 members on 115
campuses in less than a year of existence ("Campus conservatives", 1961, p.
34). The YAF’s popularity was demonstrated at a rally in Washington supporting
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the

House

Un-American

Activities

Committee

where

YAF

supporters

outnumbered opposition demonstrators.
Among the consen/ative organizations formed, the YAF is a good example
of the period's growth in organization by individual conservatives.

The group

began shortly after the 1960 convention when 90 students from 44 colleges met
at Buckley’s Connecticut estate. The stated goal was to support conservative
candidates and issues. The manifesto created at the meeting pledged support
for “the individual’s use of his...free will,” “economic freedom,” and that the U.S.
“should stress victory over” communism (’’The Sharon Statement” , 1960, p. 173).
Less than six months later, there were almost 27,000 members at over 100
campuses (Reinhard, 1983, p. 172).
Away from the campuses, the YAF held rallies and provided workers for
conservative candidates. One of the highlights of these efforts was a 1962 rally
at Madison Square Garden.

Gathering in the heart of the Eastem liberal

establishment’s domain, the rally attracted more than 18,000 attendees who
listened to various conservative speakers, including Goldwater as the last
speaker.
A further element common to Stage 2 that is found among the right is the
atmosphere of collectivity among members and the affectivity that being a
member distinguishes one from establishment members. This frame of mind is
especially evident among the campus right, who exhibited a “spirit of defiance”
(Goldberg, 1995, p. 136).

As stated by the President of the University of

Wisconsin’s Conservative Club at the time, “You walk around with your
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Goldwater button, and you feel the thrill of treason” (“Campus conservatives",
1961, p. 37).

Stage 3. Enthusiastic Mobilization
According to Stewart, Smith and Denton, “when frustration leads to
disaffection with institutions and their ability to change, the social movement
enters the stage of enthusiastic mobilization" (1994, p. 25).

At this point,

movement members go outside the establishment since it is the only way the
movement will initiate change. To accomplish change through this avenue, the
movement requires a leader who is “a charismatic agitator who confronts and
polarizes, excites and insults, unites and fragments” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 85).
One item that evidences this stage in the conservative movement is the
Draft Goldwater movement. The movement was started in October, 1961, when
F. Clifton White, a form er political science instructor at Comell, experienced
campaign

organizer,

and

a

leader of the

Young

Republicans,

heeded

Goldwateris exhortation of “lets get to work.” With the help of key strategists.
Representative John Ashbrook of Ohio and National Review publisher William
Rusher, twenty-two like-minded consen/atives from sixteen states met at a motel
in Chicago to discuss nominating a conservative Republican for president.
Included in the meeting were businessmen, congressmen, state Party chairmen,
and national committeemen (Hodgson, 1996, p. 99). From this and subsequent
meetings, a decision was made to work toward gaining conservative power in the
Republican Party, enlisting local conservative delegates for the 1964 convention.
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and, with these inroads, securing a conservative nominee for the 1964 election.
Eventually, the group came to the same conclusion as columnist Tom Anderson,
who wrote that Goldwater was the “only electable conservative” (Brennan, 1995,
p. 72). White’s group then became the National Draft Goldwater Committee^ and
worked to build a foundation which would provide the support necessary to
nominate Goldwater.
White was elected chairman and organized an office. In order to further
the group’s interests. White went about “setting up state organizations to choose
Goldwater delegates through primaries or at state conventions” (Hodgson, 1996,
p. 99). Volunteer regional directors were chosen to oversee state, county, and
local precincts. The directors’ goals were to learn how delegates were selected,
secure leaders, and organize local conservatives. White’s success was evident
within a year, as forty-two states had organizations set up by the end of 1962.
The Draft Goldwater Committee was a volunteer movement that worked to
obtain the nomination for Goldwater.

At this point, movement members had

realized that a candidate to their liking was not going to come through the
establishment’s party mechanism.

Therefore, they went outside the Party

structure to choose a candidate and set up grass roots support to ensure
Goldwateris nomination. The correlation this group has with Stewart, Smith and
Denton’s definition of Stage 3 is seen in the different strategies W hite took. First,
the group had no desire to work toward designing the Party platform (an
establishment mechanism).

Instead, the group wanted control of the state and

local Republican precincts. From this base, the conservatives could win precinct
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caucuses and county conventions that would provide the opportunity to place
conservative delegates at the Party convention.
Second, White set up ties with groups independent of the Party
establishment, such as the Young Republicans and the National Federation of
Republican Women. In addition. White obtained convention delegate lists from
as far back as 1948 in order to appeal directly to potential movement members.
These moves allowed the movement to bypass the establishment and to go
directly to potential supporters, as opposed to working through the usual Party
mechanism (e.g., the Party’s convention).
The above mentioned strategy of working outside establishment channels
and directly with movement supporters are corroborated by Brennan in her
assessment of White’s work:
Ignoring party “bigwigs” in the early stages. White concentrated on gaining
influence with such vital organizations as the Young Republicans, the
Federation of Republican Women, and the Republican National
Committee. He reminded committee members that their “primary goal
was to build delegate strength for the 1964 national convention” and to
that end urged them to organize conservatives at the precinct, district, and
state level. (1995, p. 66)
The mobilization continued through to the convention.

From the

movement’s mobilization of supporters from the local level to the state level, 130
of the 205 delegates available from non-primary states were secured for
Goldwater.

As noted by Rae in his study The Decline and Fall of Liberal

Republicans, this count “put [Goldwater] far ahead of the other contenders and
illustrated the effectiveness of the activist-oriented campaign conducted by White
and his associates at the Republican grass roots” (p. 55). Combined with the
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delegates won at the primary level, Goldwater gained the nomination on the first
ballot with almost 300 more votes than necessary for the nomination.
Another element that Stewart, Smith, and Denton find in movements
during this stage is the mobilization of the establishment against the movement
and its leader, including rhetorical attacks on the opposition that label it as
extreme and out of touch.

These attacks are found in the actions of the

establishment throughout Stage 3 as it became clear that Goldwater was going
to obtain the nomination over an establishment candidate.

Former Vice

President Richard Nixon publicly stated that Goldwater and his views m ust be
challenged by the Party (to which Goldwater replied that “Nixon sounded more
like Harold Stassen everyday”) (Reinhard, 1983, p. 188)).
As the convention drew near, the establishment’s actions continue to track
those as described by Stewart, Smith, and Denton as common establishment
reaction during this stage. First, realizing that Rockefeller was not going to win
the nomination, the establishment mobilized and “launched a last-minute crusade
for a substitute” (Iverson, 1997, p. 112).

Next, the establishment’s new

candidate, Pennsylvania Governor W illiam W. Scranton, labeled the movement
as extreme and pursued grass roots support among the Party members and
delegates.

He and his staff began by launching a rhetorical attack against

“Goldwaterism” and contacted Republican Congressional candidates telling them
that they could expect to lose if Goldwater was selected as the Republican
candidate. Scranton also attacked Goldwater as a fanatic.

He “reinforced the

image of Goldwater as an extrem ist....[and] continually evoked warmongering
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and racist images of Goldwater” (Brennan, 1995, p. 76).

Scranton’s strategy

culminated on the eve of the convention as he circulated a letter to all delegates.
In his letter, Scranton called the movement “a whole crazy-quilt collection of
absurd and dangerous positions," and labeled conservative delegates "a flock of
chickens whose necks will be wrung at will”® (quoted in Brennan, 1995, p. 76). In
the end his appeal for grass roots support did not succeed.

The letter further

alienated staunch conservative supporters and swayed undecided delegates to
Goldwater.

This result was apparent in the final delegate count.

Goldwater

received 883 votes to Scranton’s second place tally of 214 votes.
An additional element of commonality to be addressed is Stewart, Smith,
and Denton’s leadership profile and the rhetoric required during this stage. As
respects rhetorical tactics, movement leaders must be careful not to use
language which is too inflammatory.

While strong messages are required to

mobilize the movement, speeches that are too harsh can result in a loss of
support.

In a very close California primary race with Rockefeller, Goldwateris

speeches evidence a tempering.

In describing Goldwateris rhetoric, Rienhard

states:
Goldwater...watered down the content of his message. He assured
Califomia voters that he had no plans to make Social Security voluntary.
Nor did he advocate selling of the entire TVA. Although Goldwater did get
entangled on the issue of the use of low-yield atomic bombs in Vietnam,
detailed policy proposals generally gave way to “ Fourth of July Oratory.”
(1983, p. 186)
The final similarity between the conservative movement and the elements
of a social movement addresses the personality of the movement leader.
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According to Stewart, Smith, and Denton, the movement leader in this stage is
one who is “a charismatic agitator” and a person of contradiction— one who
“confronts and polarizes, excites and insults, unites and fragments” (Stewart, et
al., 1994, p. 85).
As the leader of the conservative movement and its choice as Republican
nominee, Goldwater epitomizes the authors' profile.

His style and language

contained the components necessary to fit the characteristics described by the
authors.

Specifically, Goldwater was unabashed, candid, unapologetic, no-

nonsense, and offered simplified reasoning.

He personified the adage of “he

says what he means, and means what he says.” Through Goldwateris rhetoric
and speeches, he mobilized and excited movement members while disdaining
liberal Party members. The latter was done without trepidation or apprehension
toward using conciliatory language to assuage audiences in order to win their
vote.
The extent to which Goldwateris rhetoric demonstrated the characteristics
described by the authors is seen in Goldwateris language.

The presence of

characteristics is also evident and confirmed in the comments of varied
obsen/ers of the rise of the right, including authors, biographers, journalists,
scholars, and historians.

To demonstrate the elements common to both

movement leaders and Goldwater, a sampling of his quotes as well as analyses
from observers of Goldwater are provided below outlining Goldwateris rhetoric
that “confronts and polarizes, excites and insults, unites and fragments” (Stewart,
et al., 1994, p. 85):
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Comments by Goldwater:
On the unemployed
“we are told...that many people lack skills and cannot find jobs because
they did not have an education... The fact is that most people who have no
skills have no education for the same reason— low intelligence or
ambition.” (quoted in White, 1966, p. 130)
As respects the Cuban government turning off the water at Guantanamo
“[Goldwater said] he hoped President Johnson would have the courage to
say. Turn it on or the Marines are going to tum it on for you and keep it
on.’” (White, 1966, p. 130)
Commenting on the Eastern establishment
“Sometimes I think this country would be better off if we could just saw off
the Eastern Seaboard and let it float out to sea. " (quoted in White, 1966, p.
130)
Commenting on how to handle the Soviet Union
“Let’s lob one into the m en’s room o f the Kremlin." (quoted in White, 1966,
p. 130)
Regarding Milton Eisenhower as a last minute Establishment candidate
“One Eisenhower in a decade is enough.” (quoted in Reinhard, 1983, p.
186)
Regarding his speaking style
“...the message must be direct, understandable, and unequivocal: no
hedging; no qualifications; no use o f language susceptible to more than
one interpretation.” (quotedin Hammerback, 1987, p. 176)
“Some people say that I oversimplify complicated issues. They want
complexity, I want understanding.” (quoted in Hammerback, 1987, p. 176)
On civil rights
“If I were a Negro, I don’t think I would be patient.” (quoted in Edwards,
1988, p. 62)
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I am unalterably opposed to discrimination of any sort, and I believe that
though the problem is fundamentally one o f the heart, some law can help,
but not law that embodies features like these, provisions which fly in the
face of the Constitution....If m y vote is misconstrued, let it be, and let me
suffer the consequences.” (quoted in Edwards, 1988, p. 63)
(The second comment was made explaining his vote against the 1964
Civil Rights Bill less than one month before the Republican National Convention
and shortly after the first comment):
Uniting and fragmenting
“Any who joins us in all sincerity, we welcome. Those who do not care for
our cause we do not expect to enter our ranks in any case” (Rosenthal,
1964, p. 401).
“’I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.
And let me remind you that moderation in the pursuit o f justice is no virtue’
brought the delegates to their feet for the longest applause...” (Rosenthal,
1964, p. 402Ÿ

Comments bv observers:
Regarding his dichotomous stvie of speaking
“He was a man o f contradictions: inspiring and infuriating, courageous and
cantankerous, profane and profound, impulsive and stubbom.” (Edwards,
1998, p. A18)
As an agitator and his ability to confront
“...he invariably did what he wanted to, when he wanted to— regardless o f
the consequences.” (Edwards, 1998, p. A18)
“He gave people his 100-proof opinions, which he did not originate in
focus groups and were not mediated by consultants.” (Will, 1998, p. M5)
“He Insisted on speaking his mind, regardless o f the consequences.”
(Edwards, 1988, p. 60)
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“He has always been candid, even if the result is to bring discomfort to
fellow conservatives...” (Hammerback, 1987, p. 174)
“He thinks nothing of voting a ll by him self in the Senate against 90-odd
others.” (Wicker, 1963, p. 29)
On his ability to excite and unite
“...the delegates savored their passionate hero’s blunt version o f the
‘truth. ’ The Senator, their ‘symbol, the jut-jawed Man of the West, bluff,
candid, simple, direct, and an apostle o f change, ’ thrilled their hearts, if not
their minds.” (Rosenthal, 1964, p. 403)
On his charisma
“The candidate looked every inch as if central casting had come up with
exactly what the director asked fo r the good-looking, Westem
outdoorsman who rode tall in the saddle and hewed true to his core o f old
American principle.” (Hodgson, 1996, p. 91)
“...even his political opponents agree that Goldwater has that rarest o f
attributes—star quality. A tanned, trim (185 lbs.) six footer with searching
blue eyes behind his dark-rimmed glasses....Barry Goldwater is alm ost
too good to be true: a businessman, politician, je t pilot, folklorist, explorer,
photographer, and athlete.” ( “Republicans: Salesman f or a cause”, 1961,
p. 12)

Issue 2
The second theory addressed by the study concerns the traits of a
movement leader.

The theory, Simons’ “leader-centered conception,” will be

applied to the historical events that surrounded Goldwateris rise to leader of the
conservative movement.
Simons’ theory is useful in this paper for two reasons. First, Goldwateris
rise and acceptance by the right were rhetorically driven. He expressed his ideas
and attracted supporters via books, newspaper columns and speeches. Second,
Simons argues that a movement’s leader must be able to adjust to any actions
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and take advantage of any overreactions. This theory fits well with this paper’s
premise that the takeover of the Republican Party by the conservative movement
was due in large part to the establishment’s reactions to the conservative
movement.
According to Simons, there are three requirements for a leader.

First,

leaders “must attract, maintain, and mold workers (i.e., followers) into an
efficiently organized unit” and the movement’s success is dependent on “loyalty
to its leadership” (1970, p. 3).
Goldwateris supporters were an essential element to his rise. They were
dedicated and unwavering in their support for him and saw Goldwater as the
“spiritual and intellectual leader of the Republican Party” (Kolkey, 1983, p. 177).
In summarizing the movement as it rallied around Goldwater, columnist Tom
Wicker offered these observations of Goldwateris following:
It is more nearly a radical revolt, a gathering of the forces of the
discontented and embittered - as nearly united as they can be in idolatry
or exploitation of the most attractive “conservative” since Herbert Hoover
came home a hero from W orld W ar I. (1963, p. 7)
Simons’ second requirement is that a leader “must secure adoption of
their product by the larger structure [and insist that a] new order and a vast
regeneration of values are necessary to smite the agents of the old and to
provide happiness, harmony, and stability” (1970, p. 4).
As a leader, Goldwater did not seek approval of the establishment.
Instead, he worked to replace the established order with his supporters. Here he
was successful as well as undeviating in his purpose.

His supporters had
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assumed control of local Republican organizations which helped him obtain a
run-away first ballot nomination fo r President.

In response, he installed his

people to top spots in the national party, including Republican Committee
Chairman and Vice Presidential nominee.
Goldwater was not shy about letting the establishment know of his and the
movement’s intent. He stated in his acceptance speech: “Any who joins us in all
sincerity, we welcome. Those who do not care for our cause we do not expect to
enter our ranks in any case” (Rosenthal, 1964, p. 401).
Another example of the spirit of disdain for reconciliation was Goldwateris
remarks in his acceptance speech in which he said, “Extremism in the defense of
liberty is no vice...Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue” (Harwood,
1964, p. 2). This exhortation was a retort to the establishment who had shunned
and derided him and his more extreme supporters.
The speech also represented the zenith of the confrontation between the
right and the establishment.

It delineated a clear separation between the two

groups. Through his words, Goldwater identified where the right stood and made
clear its identity for those that wished to join. As Robert Catchcart describes:
The enactment of confrontation gives a movement its identity, its
substance and its form. No movement for radical change can be taken
seriously without acts of confrontation.... Confrontational rhetoric shouts
“Stop!” at the system, saying, “You cannot go on assuming you are the
true and correct order; you must see yourself as the evil thing you are.
(Cathcart, 1978, p. 234)
The latter item in Simons’ second requirement is evident in the themes
stressed by Goldwater.

These

were traditional conservative
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conservatives thought

had

been

abandoned

and

ignored

by the

party

establishment as they continually acquiesced to the Democrats and the New
Deal, thus earning the establishment the nickname “me-too Republicans” (Cook,
1996, p. 942). The themes are succinctly summed up in The Conscience of a
Conservative, when Goldwater said his intent was "to reduce the size of
government. Not to pass laws but to repeal them. Not to institute new programs
but to eliminate old ones" (1960, p. 23).
Goldwater enunciated the differences between the two factions when
Nelson Rockefeller (the quintessential “Eastem” Republican) claimed that
Goldwater was outside the mainstream.

Goldwater responded, “the American

People want a choice, not an echo” (Rosenthal, 1964, p. 400).
The third requirement according to Simons is that leaders “must react to
resistance generated by the larger structure.”

According to Simons, the

establishment, in response to a movement against the power structure, will do
one of two things.

First, they may incorporate the movement’s demands or

promise to act on them. Their second option is to come down strong against the
movement. The movement’s leader must be able to adjust to any actions and
take advantage of any overreactions.
In response to the conservative movement, the establishment did not
pursue Simons’ first option.

As has been stated, they continually ignored the

right wing in pursuit of their own interests.
Simons’ second option.
followers’ ideas.

Their course of strategy mirrored

In 1964, the establishment derided Goldwater and his

As mentioned before, Goldwater was accused of having
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simplified beliefs and answers. In addition, “Rockefeller blasted” the Goldwater
followers “as the ‘lunatic fringe’” and “Richard Nixon called” them “the nuts and
the kooks” (Wicker, 1963, p. 24).
However, the major resistance from the establishment was to continually
ignore the conservative movement.

As discussed earlier, this occurred from

1940 through 1960. The mistake here though, is that in their disregard for the
consen/atives, the establishment did not take into account the burgeoning size
and influence of the source of the conservatives’ support, which was the post-war
growth in the westem and southern states. Therefore, in 1964, with Goldwater
as their candidate, the conservatives had sufficient strength to push him to
nomination.
In summary. Chapter 4 has assessed the correlation between the events
of Chapter 3 and the commonalties found in movements as established in
Chapter 2. The following and final chapter will address the paper’s two issues of
study (whether the rise of the right wing represented a true social movement, and
if Goldwater can be viewed as a movement leader) based on application of the
methodology applied in this chapter. In addition to these issues, the next chapter
will also discuss what has been learned about Goldwater and the conservative
movement, about communication and its relation to social movements, and what
future studies the study’s findings give rise to.
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Chapter Notes
^Although liberals called the title an oxymoron, a senior editor at Time
labeled it “the most important book of the 20^ century.” In addition, it received
favorable reviews from 47 of its first 50 reviews, including from the New York
Times (Edwards, 1988, p. 59).
^Along with voicing his displeasure with Eisenhower’s budget, Goldwater
was also blunt with his comments and criticism of the Party’s liberal members. In
his

autobiography,

Goldwater

recounts

his

battle

during this

time

with

establishment leaders:
This [the budget speech] was the start of a long public debate and the
eventual conservative break with the party’s so-called moderate wing,
which was headed by...Rockefeller, Senator Jacob Javits....Rocky and
Javits, the “Me Too” Twins, claimed I was “alienating” liberal Republicans
and was outside the political mainstream— as defined by them. I waved a
political good-bye to Javits...by suggesting that Jake “go straight” and join
the Democrats.
^Further

infuriating

the

boosters

was

the

impression

that

their

demonstrations in support of Goldwater were being stifled by building security
forces under the direction of Nixon staffers.
^Manion was the impetus for Conscience of a Conservative, he originally
approached Goldwater with the idea and helped set up the book’s publication.
®The decision to go through with, and public with, its intent to draft
Goldwater was done so without Goldwateris blessing.

This did not deter the

group. As Theodore H. White notes, the group decided “they would ‘draft the son
of a bitch’ whether he wanted to run or not” (1966, p. 117).
tersely told Clifton White that he was not a candidate.

Goldwater even

However, even with his
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ambivalence about running, Goldwater did not publicly repudiate the group. He
did stay clear of the group’s headquarters and rallies though.
®Scranton’s actions are particularly interesting given that he served under
Goldwater in the Air Force Reserve and that Goldwater considered him “his only
friend among possible GOP presidential contenders” (Reinhard, 1983, p. 188).
In fact, Goldwateris probable first choice for a running mate was Scranton, until
the letter was distributed.
^According to the writer of this speech, Harry Jaffa, Goldwateris use of this
phrase was because he was tired of being labeled an extremist throughout the
convention.

In response, “he turned his detractors’ favorite epithet back upon

them” (Jaffa, 1984, p. 36).

The inspiration for the quote came from Thomas

Paine’s The Rights of Man. “Moderation in temper is always a virtue; but
moderation in principle is always a vice” (Jaffa, 1984, p. 36). Jaffa states that he
tried to submit commentary on Goldwateris speech but that no editor would
accept his articles.
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CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY

Introduction
Chapter 2 outlined the methodology to be used as the apparatus in
defining the profile of a social movement and a movement leader.

The next

chapter then reviewed the historical events surrounding the takeover of the
Republican Party by the conservative right wing. Chapter 4 applied the common
elements found in movements and its leaders described in Chapter 2 to the
events that comprised the right’s ascension to power as described in Chapter 3.
These chapters have established the groundwork for the purpose of this
study. As such, Chapter 5 will analyze the conservative movement of the fifties
and early sixties as a social movement and Goldwater as a movement leader.
Following the discussion of the above two issues, the chapter will address
further issues pertinent to, and arising from , the study of the right and Goldwater.
The focus of these issues will be what has been leamed from the study about:
a. The consen/ative movement of the 1950s and the early 1960s
b. Barry Goldwater
c. Social movements
d. Communications
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e. Relevant issues of further study as respects the paper’s study

Analysis
As respects Issues 1 and 2, an appraisal of the previous chapters affirms
that the actions of the right were indeed that of a social movement.

Similarly,

Goldwateris position as leader of the conservative movement can be equated
with that of a social movement leader. This parallel was evidenced in Chapter 4
through

the

numerous

commonalties

noted

that

existed

between

the

conservative movement and the accepted definition and characteristics of social
movements.

Chapter 4 also confirmed that Goldwateris rhetoric and actions

conformed to the criterion of a movement leader, as established by Simons and,
to a lesser degree, by Stewart, Smith, and Denton.
Thus, applying Simons’ as well as Stewart, Smith, and Denton’s studies of
social movements to the right and Goldwater’s leadership affirms that the two
exhibit the traits necessary to view the two as a social movement and a
movement leader.

However, there is still an additional issue to be addressed

before this judgement can be conceded. That question is whether a movement
within an
movement.

established societal

organization

can

be considered

a social

Studies do not provide a consensus opinion on this issue.

Most

scholars follow the lead of Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen as outlined in their study.
The Rhetoric of Agitation and Confrontation. The authors clearly state, ‘T h is
book does not classify those who attempt to persuade within the establishment
as agitators..." (Bowers, et al., 1993, p. 4).
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This “non-establishment” position, which has probably contributed to the
lack of study of the right wing as a social movement, can be traced to the
movement theories of Simons and Cathcart.

Simons has stated that “a social

movement may be defined...as an uninstitutionalized (italics added) collectivity
that mobilizes for action to implement a program for the reconstitution of social
norms or values” (Simons, 1970, p. 3). Cathcart argues, as stated in Barbara
W am ick’s study The Rhetoric of Conservative Resistance, that “aggressor
rhetors in these movements are seeking a new o rde r-on e which cannot come
about through the established agencies of change” (1977, p. 257).
Given Simons' and Cathcart’s theories, the collective action of the
conservatives would not be considered a movement. First, because it is a faction
within the Republican Party, it is an institutionalized collectivity and does not fit
Simons’ definition.

Second, per Cathcart, the right is not a social movement

because it sought to implement changes through Republican precinct elections,
state delegations, and party conventions-all of which are “established agencies
of change.”
In addition to Simons’ and Cathcart’s studies, W amick goes a step further.
In her study of conservative movements, she re-defines conservative movements
as something other than a social movement.

Expanding on Simons’ and

Cathcart’s original definitions, she argues that conservative movements are
“counter-movements.”

By this she means that conservative movements, as

opposed to other ideology based social movements, seek to “prevent a proposed
change” rather than “advocating a basic change in the existing social order”
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(Wamick,

1977, p. 257).

In addition, W amick daims that conservative

movements are identifiable by unique characteristics-the movement's ideology,
its moralism, and its resistance to compromise.
Addressing the argument of what groups constitute social movements, this
thesis contends that the definition includes movements acting within institutions.
Justification for broadening the definition of a movement is that there are
common characteristics institutionalized movements share with movements from
outside the establishment. As with non-institutionalized movements, groups such
as the conservative movement also experience feelings of alienation, anger, and
frustration with established powers. These feelings produce support among the
ranks of “within institution” movements as fervent as seen in non-institutional
movements.
Simons express the justification for this conclusion in his later article on
movements in which he changed his perspective on the issue. He argues that
movements are not solely “bottom up struggles by groups at the margins of
society” (Simons, 1991, p. 100) or outside the establishment.

He adjusted his

original position to conclude “movements are struggles on behalf of a cause by
groups whose core organizations, modes of action, and/or guiding ideas are not
fully legitimated by the larger society” (Simons, 1991, p. 100). In the case of the
right, its ideas were not accepted as norms by the Republican Party, which in this
case was the “larger society.” Also, the fact that institutionalized groups are
factions from within and intend only to discard or amend current mechanisms or
programs, as opposed to the whole system, should not preclude their legitimacy
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as a social movement. Not all movements are going to be from organizations on
the fringe of society that are looking to overthrow or discard the current
establishment. Further, considering how institutionalized government programs
become, it takes a movement to implement even minor changes.
In any event though, it is difficult today to set a limited framework for
defining a social movement given the ongoing changes and advances in society
and technology. As a result of the increasing number of communication avenues
available to promote a position (e.g., the Internet, fax broadcasts, e-mail, mailing
lists, talk shows, cable access channels, etc) more and more special interest
groups have opportunities to promote their message.

Additionally, society’s

increasing access to these media outlets increases the exposure of a group’s
message.

Therefore, a movement that earlier would have floundered, or not

have achieved becoming a full-fledged movement, due to the inability to get their
message out to large numbers of people, can today develop into a strong social
movement due to the media and technology access available to everyone
Regarding Wamick’s study of conservative movements, her conclusion is
too restrictive, particularly the practice of classifying consen/ative movements by
using specific characteristics.

As Martin T. Medhurst argues in his study of

consen/ative resistance, Wamick’s theory results in equating the conservative
movement solely with the radical right and reactive uncompromising positions—as
opposed to consen/ative movements that represent “substantive policy positions
that carry within themselves the possibility for change” (Medhurst, 1985, p. 109).
He also argues that Wamick is incorrect because movement strategy and
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rhetoric have similar characteristics on both sides of the political spectrum. As
Medhurst states;
Conservative rhetoric, like its liberal sister, is neither monolithic nor
homogeneous. To assert that the rhetoric of conservative resistance is
invariably characterized by moralism, reiteration of ideology, and
resistance to compromise is to confuse one species with an entire genre.
(Medhurst, 1982, p. 18)
Finally, the use of an expanded definition of what constitutes a social
movement is summed up well by Sillars. In his movement study, he argues that
critics have been too narrow in their definition of a movement, thus limiting the
usefulness of their studies.
defining a movement.

Future analyses should “cast the widest net” in

As a basis for this, he states that “there are an infinite

number of acts that may be put together in an infinite number of combinations.
These combinations, which we call movements, are continually changing.”
(Sillars, 1980, p. 27).
The above discussion of the right as a social movement also addresses
the issue of what has been leamed about social movements. First, the study has
shown that movements can exist within an institutional structure. Minority
movements within established structures are still subjected to the same factors
as similar groups outside of establishments that drive them to organizing a
movement—feelings of alienation, rejection, and also of concern with what the
members see as critical imperfections.

Furthermore, as demonstrated in the

previous chapters, institutionalized movements must employ the same strategies
in order to implement change.
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As respects the conservative movement of the fifties and early sixties, the
thesis has demonstrated th at the movement was an important one and warrants
study.

Theodore White, in his study of the 1964 elections, confirms the

classification of the right's collective effort as a movement and also its place in
history;
‘Movement’ was the proper word. The wordless resentments, angers,
frustrations, fears and hopes that were shaping this force...had welled up
long before Goldwater took his Presidential chances seriously. But the
movement was something deep, a change or a reflection of change in
American life that qualified as more than American politics— it was history.
(White, 1966, p. 112)
The reasons for

the

movement’s significance are

many,

but are

manifested in its resiliency and the long-term effect the movement had on the
Party. Even though the conservatives’ candidate suffered a crushing defeat in
1964, the movement did not die.

Rather, “[Goldwater’s] defeat became the

preface rather than the epitaph for a conservative movement that has reshaped
American politics” (Gerson, 1998, p. 12).
Commenting on the successful tenure of the conservative movement,
George Will makes a comparison to its counterpart on the left, that “the residue
of dissent on the left has long since gone to earth on campuses, there to nurse
frustrations and fantasies. Dissent on the right rose to power” (Will, 1998, p. M5).
With Goldwater’s nomination in 1964, the movement gained a “commanding
voice

in the

Republican

Party that [it] would

never

wholly

relinquish”

(Himmelstein, 1990, p. 69) and made an impact on the shape of the Party that is
still visible almost forty years later. The significant aftereffects include the legacy
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of Ronald Reagan, whose career was launched with ‘T h e Speech”, his
introduction of Goldwater at the 1964 convention; a shift in the Party’s power
base from the east to the South and the West; the start of political fund raising
through direct mail as Richard Viguerie developed his “direct-mail fund-raising
empire” with 12,500 names of Goldwater contributors (Himmelstein, 1990, p. 69);
and a generation of youthful activists, described by U.S. News & World Report as
“the other counterculture of the 1960s” (Gerson, 1998, p. 14), inspired to enter
and remain in politics. Commenting on the last point in a 1998 article, Edwards
states, ‘Today, these no-longer-young conservatives sit in Congress, manage
campaigns, head think tanks, edit magazines, and host television talk shows” (p.
A18).
The right’s impact is summed up in the title of conservative philosopher
Richard Weaver’s book Ideas Have Consequences (1948). The conservatives'
ideas of the 1950s provided the inspiration for the movement to organize. As a
result of its organizing, two goals were achieved, Goldwater’s winning the
Republican nomination in 1964 and the implementation of the conservative’s
ideas. Republican economist Martin Anderson (a veteran of both the Nixon and
Reagan administrations) summed up the impact of the conservative revolution
when he said:
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and many of the events that
followed were the political results of an intellectual movement building...for
many years....That movement was no accident, but rather the logical
outgrowth of policy ideas and political forces set in motion during the
1950s and 1960s, ideas and forces that gathered strength and speed
during the 1970’s, then achieved power in the 1980’s, and promise to
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dominate national policy in the United States for the remainder of the
twentieth century. (Hodgson, 1996, p. 8)
The next step in the thesis is to appraise what has been discemed about
Goldwater. In line with the conservative movement, the study has demonstrated
that Goldwater is a movement leader who merits study. The basis for studying
Goldwater is best seen by reviewing some of the unique facets of the Goldwater
mystique.
First, Goldwater was as a leader. He inspired his followers by being able
to “stir up great excitement” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 79). This ability is seen
among movement members who state that Goldwater manifested a “passionate
love affair” and his message “took our breath away” (Gerson, 1998, p. 16). As
White writes, “Goldwater’s favorite style in politics is exhortation; he is a
moralizer....He preaches, he does not direct.

He arouses emotion...” (White,

1966, p. 112). Goldwater also sees himself as a leader, “I have the unmitigated
gall to think that I could lead men anywhere, business, politics or combat”
(quoted in Goldberg, 1995, p. 118).
Goldwater was also a unique and unlikely movement leader. As opposed
to the Eastem, Wall Street, blue blooded establishment, he was a principled
individualist from the West who had dropped out of college to run the family’s
business (Goldwater is even on the record as admitting “I haven’t really got a first
class mind” (Will, 1998, p. M5)). To further enhance the image, he was also an
experienced pilot and adventurer. When World War II started, Goldwater, after
meeting initial denials by the Army A ir Corps because of his eyesight, flew C-47s
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to the Pacific theatre over the treacherous Himalayan “Hump.” After the War,
Goldwater continued his flying, tallying hours in more than 170 types of planes
and, at age 50, flew at twice the speed of sound. When he received Kennedy’s
message to come to the White House to discuss the Bay of Pigs, Goldwater was
sitting in the cockpit of a fighter jet getting ready to log hours on a flight to Luke
Air Force Base in Phoenix.
Another facet of Goldwater was that he placed conservative philosophy
and tenets at the center of his message, even at the risk of alienating others or
losing less committed members.

Goldwater recognized this trait and the

associated risks when he commented, “I am quite aware of the risks in speaking
frankly and candidly” (Hammerback, 1987, p. 174). Candid and open talk was
evident as he campaigned for President.

Goldwater criticized the TVA while

campaigning in Tennessee and tobacco subsidies while in North Carolina.

He

also called for privatizing Social Security during campaign trips in Florida. As his
deputy press secretary recalled, “Goldwater told me if he was going to lose, it
would be on his terms” (Gerson, 1998, p. 14).
Perhaps the most glaring example of his disregard for political fallout while
maintaining his principles is his 1964 Civil Rights Act vote.

Goldwater voted

against the bill, even though he was in the middle of his campaign for President,
behind in the polls to the incumbent, and 80% of his fellow congressional
Republicans were supporting the bill (a higher percentage than among the
Democrats). Yet, his vote was not the act of a bigot. Goldwater had integrated
the Arizona Air National Guard and the Goldwater department stores. Also, as a
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Phoenix City Council member, he threatened to pull the lease from a Phoenix
airport restaurant that refused to serve black customers.

Instead though,

Goldwater’s vote was an act of principle, defiant of pubic opinion polls.

To

Goldwater, the Civil Rights Act was a violation of states’ rights and an affront to
the Constitution.
An addition contributor to Goldwater’s significance is his foresight.
Goldwater introduced positions that were ridiculed by opponents and the press
as reactionary, but that today are accepted on both sides of the aisle. These
issues include school vouchers, a flat tax, voluntary participation in Social
Security, and an end to the farm subsidies program.
To sum up Goldwater’s importance as a leader and a subject of study it is
best to look at quotes from White and Edwards. White writes:
Again and again in American history it has happened that the loser of the
presidency contributed almost as much to the permanent tone and
dialogue of politics as did the winners. Goldwater was such a defining
candidate. His presidential bid was essential to the development of
modem American conservatism. (White, 1966, p. 132)
Edwards echoes W hite's judgement as he calls Goldwater “the most
important loser in American politics” (Gerson, 1998, p. 14).
Another area to be addressed in this chapter that is of relevance to the
study’s subject is the interplay of communication and social movements.

In

particular, two issues warrant mention.
First, the study demonstrates that rhetoric and discourse can provoke and
sustain a movement.

Through language that is defined with terms such as

“candid,” “blunt,” “unmistakable,” “gutsy,” “unabashed,” and “unapologetic,”
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Goldwater’s speeches aroused members both as a Senator and a candidate. He
was able to mobilize the members, excite, and inspire them.

For example,

Goldwater’s speech at the 1960 Republican convention scolded and inspired
activists to take action as he told them to “grow up” and that “if we want to take
this party back—and I think we can someday— let’s get to work” (“Text of
Goldwater’s withdrawl speech", 1961, p. 14).

Further, the rhetoric of the

movement, even in the face of defeat in 1964, sustained the members’ spirit to
continue their cause.
An additional lesson about social movements concerns the methods of
persuasion and the strategies used to achieve power.

The conservative

movement established that a movement can be effective in gaining supporters
and achieving power by using rhetorical persuasion and by working within
available channels, as opposed to using threats or violent machinations (such as
bombings or building takeovers), as a means to obtain support and implement
programs.
In their quest for power, conservatives used joumals, speeches, rallies,
and signature drives to rhetorically state their case and obtain and solidify
support. Additionally, they worked within established avenues to invoke change
and to forge new power and a new philosophy in the Party. Members set about
leaming the delegate nominating system and finding the options available to
them for taking command, thus obtaining control of the Party’s nomination
process.

The movement worked to place sympathetic members in local and
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state Republican organizations—groups independent of the Eastem led national
Party organization and taken for granted by the establishment.
Thus, the rhetorical and strategic methods used by the conservative
movement, albeit less dramatic, demonstrate that movements can be successful
without using coercive methods that threaten continued violence until the group’s
views are implemented. This course of action can be considered a reason why
the right was able to organize such a committed following.
contemporary groups such as

Operation

Rescue, the

As opposed to

right’s method

of

persuasion was based on changing attitudes through rhetorical communication,
as opposed to gaining support because people fear the possibility of further
violent acts (e.g., takeovers of buildings, bombings of clinics, broken windows,
disrupted classes, etc.).
An additional topic to consider about communication as respects social
movements is that rhetoric is a necessary tool for the growth and development of
a social movement. Through the movement leader’s speeches and discourse, its
ideas and philosophy are conveyed to members.

Thus, the members are

mobilized and inspired. In addition, communication is a necessary tool that gains
committed members. As seen with the right, committed members will continue
supporting the cause even in the face of dramatic setbacks, such as Goldwater’s
defeat in 1964.

This commitment was the result of Goldwater’s passionate

communication.
A further item that can be noted is that through the works of Stewart,
Smith, and Denton, and Simons, a framework exists for studying social
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movements.

Their efforts allow one to look at collective actions through the

group’s rhetoric, leaders, members, and actions to establish whether “the
phenomenon under study is a trend, a fad, or unrest” or a “full-fledged social
movement” (Stewart, et al., 1994, p. 3).
The final issue to be considered in this chapter deals with areas of further
study. This paper’s study of the right suggests many routes that warrant such
study.
The first subject is the right as it achieved Stewart, Smith, and Denton’s
Stages 4 and 5. The conservative movement did achieve power of the Party. As
such, it would be of interest to analyze the actions and rhetoric of the dissidents
after they became members of the establishment.

In the same vein, the

philosophies of Goldwater should be compared to the principles espoused by the
new leaders as well as the programs implemented via their control.
A further study related to the progression of the conservatives is of
Goldwater’s role proceeding his 1964 loss.
position?

Did he maintain his leadership

Were his previously inspired followers still moved to action by

Goldwater’s statements?

Did his rhetorical style remain consistent?

Did he

remain staunchly committed to conservative ideals and candidates?

Did he

retain his independence in his later years, or did his loss of leadership make him
spiteful to new conservative leaders?
This subject is interesting for a couple of reasons.
presidential

loss,

Goldwater

retumed

to

govemment

First, after his
under

different

circumstances. In order to run for president, he was forced to give up his senate
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seat. Therefore, when he entered the senate again in 1968 he had lost seniority
and much of his power. Second, Goldwater*s later actions were unlike that of a
man known as “Mr. Conservative.” For instance, in later years he did not offer
blanket support of conservative causes or candidates. He supported Nixon over
Reagan and Ford over Reagan.

Goldwater also defended liberal social views

such as abortion rights and support for gays in the military (to which he
commented “You don’t need to be straight to shoot straight”).

He also voted

against airline deregulation; for the Lockheed bailout; and for funding of the
Central Arizona Water project, a $3.6 billion federal project originally “designed to
water desert agriculture

but

now

underwrites

[Phoenix’s]

urban

growth”

(Goldberg, 1995, p. 337).
A third area for further study is the press coverage of Gold water’s
campaign—was it biased and did the movement have to fight an additional
institution, the main-stream press?

Did it play a role in the outcome of

Goldwateris campaign?
The basis for this proposal is from recent analyses of the consen/ative
movement and of Goldwateris campaign that have commented on the bias of the
press’ coverage against Goldwater.

For instance, A&E television network’s

“Biography This Week” noted in their review of Goldwateris life how liberal
Republicans attacked Goldwater, and added that even “the press joined the
charge....There were insinuations he was a Nazi” (Baker, 1998).

Jeffrey

Matthews, writing in Presidential Quarterlv. commented that “the press distorted
[Goldwateris] positions” (Matthews, 1997, p. 673) and quotes David Broderis
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confirmation that the press presented a “fundamentally distorted picture of who
Goldwater was or what he represented” (Matthews, 1997, p. 678).

Finally,

Hodgson, in his study of the right’s rise, writes that coverage of Goldwateris
campaign was “perhaps the most one-sided and unfair press coverage ever
deployed in a presidential campaign” (Hodgson, 1996, p. 104). The press, “not
content with outrageously negative comment...vied with one another to misreport
what Goldwater actually said” (Hodgson, 1996, p. 104).’ Specific examples cited
by Hodgson include CBS’ Daniel Schorr’s uncorroborated report that Goldwater
was “in touch with the Right Wing in Germany,” and Good Housekeeping’s
“completely untrue and unsourced” story that Goldwater had previously suffered
two nervous breakdowns (Hodgson, 1996, p. 104).^
A final area of consideration
movements.

for future

study

is

institutionalized

Expanding the definition of a movement to include those within

established organizations would result in an expanded field of study and a
greater breadth of knowledge gained about how movements can be identified.
As has been justified by this study’s analysis of the rise of right’s ascension,
there are valuable lessons to be leamed from the collective actions of minority
factions within institutionalized organizations— What rhetorical actions were
taken? What inspired the members to maintain their faith, even against daunting
setbacks? What were the characteristics of a successful leader?

Summary
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To summarize the thesis, the previous chapters outlined the events that
led to the right wing's ascension to power.

The change in power eventually

transpired

Republican

in

1964

with

the

first

ballot

nomination

of

the

conservatives’ choice, Barry Goldwater, for President. His rise and nomination
marked the end of the Eastem establishment’s domination of the party’s control
and the beginning of influence from conservative party members from the West
and the South, an arrangement that still exists today.
Goldwater was the perfect leader for the rise of the conservative
movement. There was a strong faction in the Republican Party of conservatives
who were not being heard. What the movement needed was a leader who loyal
supporters could rally around; inspire their confidence enough to draw them into
the political process; rhetorically seize the issues and concems of the movement;
and, react to the establishment, either their cooperation or backlash. Goldwater
met these requirements.
Goldwater, through his books,

newspaper columns,

and speeches

engaged his supporters on their own ground. By not coming to them through the
establishment’s machinery, he was able to firm up the dedication of the
supporters who then became tireless workers for the movement. His message
would not have had the same effect had he worked within the establishment’s
channels. Without this effect, he would not have been able to be the leader of
the conservative movement or be able to convince the followers to participate in
the movement.
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In addition, it should be noted that the Eastem establishment created and
could have prevented their 1964 exclusion from the Party’s new establishment.
The establishment’s own prior exclusion of, and lack of credence toward, both
the right wing’s candidates and concems pushed the right to the point of
disenfranchisement. Also, members of the Eastem establishment were not team
players when their candidate lost in 1964. They offered lackluster or no support
for the victors, even though the right had previously accepted and supported,
albeit reluctantly, the establishment’s candidates when conservative candidates
lost (for example, in 1960, Goldwater made 126 speeches in 26 states for
Nixon’s campaign (Brennan, 1992, p. 81)). As such, the anger generated by the
actions of the establishment prior to and during 1964 created a spirit of
retribution. The liberal Republicans were kept out of the Republican tent and the
power of the party was transferred to the right.
By applying the sequence of events that led to the takeover of the Party to
the framework established defining a social movement and a movement leader
the study confirmed the right’s place as a social movement.

In addition, the

analysis verifies Goldwateris position as a movement leader.
The most appropriate way to close the thesis is to quote the comments of
Mary Brennan and George Will on, respectively, the conservative movement and
Goldwater. The comments touch on some of the ideas brought up in this study
and verify the right and Goldwater as significant areas of study:
The Right’s capture of the Republican Party fully legitimized conservatism.
The growth of an energized constituency paved the way for right-wingers
to seize control of the GOP. Intent on building from the precinct level up

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98
instead of merely imposing their ideas from the top, conservatives
cultivated the support of county chairs and state workers who felt
neglected by the national party.
This strategy avoided direct
confrontations with liberal Republicans and ensured that when victory
came on the national level, it was complete. (Brennan, 1995, p. 141)
Regarding Goldwater, Will writes, “he was one of the creative losers—
William Jennings Bryan was another—of American politics. Which means that
neither he nor Bryan really were losers, having left larger marks on the nation
than many a winner has done. (1998, p. M5)
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Chapter Notes
’ Hodgson goes on to comment that the misrepresentations weren’t all that
necessary, since Goldwater’s off-the-cuff style and his devoid of concem as to
how his comments might be construed provided straight quotes that were “scary
enough."
^It is interesting to note how members of the media viewed Goldwater
upon his death in 1998.

Analysts who thought his original positions were

unacceptable, now claim that he has become more moderate and thus more
“reasonable”. Conversely, conservative reporter Robert Novak opined that he
“set back the conservative movement by 16 years” (Baker, 1998). However, in
1963, Novak commented that Goldwater was leading a “transformation in the
party’s power structure” and that “conservative young Republicans from the
...W est and South are seizing power” (Hodgson, 1996, p. 101).
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